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Abstract 
   
It is still controversial whether mental practice – the internal rehearsal of movements to 
improve later performance – relies on processes engaged during physical motor performance 
and, if so, which processes these are. This series of experiments investigates this question. It 
utilizes a framework of ideomotor action planning theories, and tests whether mental practice 
may specifically draw upon planning- rather than execution-related motor processes, 
specifically those processes that “bind” intended action features to action plans.  
Experiments 1 to 4 utilize a classical stimulus response compatibility paradigm. 
Participants mentally practiced complex rhythms with either feet or hands while using the 
same or different body parts to respond to unrelated sounds. In contrast to previous work on 
stimulus response compatibility, we indeed found that responses were impaired – rather than 
facilitated – for those body parts that were concurrently used in mental practice. This result 
was found when participants mentally trained to memorize the rhythms (Experiment 1), to 
merely improve their performance (Experiment 3), when mental practice and execution 
directly followed one another and when separated by a different task (Experiment 4). These 
data link mental practice not to execution but planning related motor processes that are 
involved in binding intended action features to intended action plans.  
Experiment 5 and 6 then extend these results to imitation learning. Participants were 
instructed to learn the rhythms by observing somebody else, while again making unrelated 
responses with their hand and feet. While previous work on stimulus response compatibility 
focussed on testing automatic imitation processes, here imitation was therefore goal directed. 
We found, as in the previous experiments, that responses with the same body parts as used in 
the observed rhythms were impaired, suggesting that goal-directed imitation might rely on 
the same planning-related motor processes as the mental practice of action (Experiment 5). 
Importantly, these effects were only found as long as participants observed the actions with 
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the purpose of imitating them later (i.e. formed action plans), but not when they merely tried 
to memorize the rhythms for later recognition (Experiment 6). 
The previous experiments suggest that mental practice and observation learning draw 
upon body-part specific planning processes. Ideomotor theories suggest, however, that action 
plans can be relatively abstract, and represented in terms of higher-level goals (i.e. the 
sequence of left and right button presses independent of the body part used). Experiment 7 
and 8 therefore tested whether rhythms learned through mental practice or observation 
learning could be transferred to other body parts. As expected, we found a relatively high 
amount of potential transfer when rhythms were mentally practiced with one body part, and 
then had to be transferred to another body part (Experiment 7). However, this only held when 
participants learned the rhythms based on an abstract rhythm description, as in Experiments 1 
to 4. If participants learned the same rhythms during action observation, any benefits were 
only obtained when the rhythms later had to be executed with the same (rather than a 
different) body part. 
Together, the present data suggest that mental practice does not rely on execution 
related-motor processes, and points to an involvement of planning related motor processes 
instead. We argue that such a planning-based account of mental practice is more compatible 
with the available evidence from body neuroscientific and behavioral studies, and allows one 
to resolve several debates. Moreover, it allows one to conceptualize goal-directed imitation in 
a similar manner as mental practice. 
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General Introduction 
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1.1. Mental Practice: Definition and Theories  
 
Mental practice, the internal rehearsal of movements to improve later performance, underlies 
both the development and the execution of many of our motor skills. It can be defined as the 
mental repetition of a task, without observable movement (e.g., Corbin, 1972), or, as 
Rodriguez, Lianos, Gonzalez, and Sabate (2008) put it: “… a dynamic mental representation 
of motor behaviour unaccompanied by real movement”. It is assumed to rely on motoric 
mental imagery and is used in a goal directed manner to prepare an actor for later 
performance (Driskell, Copper & Moran, 1994; Stuart & Biddle, 1985).  
Mental practice is widely used by athletes to achieve best possible performance and by 
coaches to teach and develop motor skills, particularly with difficult behaviours or complex 
performance situations. It typically takes one of two forms. First, mental practice can directly 
precede action execution, taking the form of an explicit act of motor planning (Jeannerod, 
1995; 1994). Platform divers may take a few seconds to visualize their movements before 
jumping off, or weightlifters may visualize the ideal weight distribution relative to their 
gravity centre. However, second, mental practice can also be used “offline” and be used to 
play through behaviours the athlete will perform much later, often in circumstances that bear 
no similarity to the actual performance situation. For example, former England goalkeeper 
David James supported his training regime by engaging in mental practice. Even when stuck 
in traffic, he would “do a few crosses in his mind” (Winter, 2002).  
Mental practice lends its users various general benefits. For example, mental practice has 
direct emotional benefits. It helps develop self-confidence and reduce worry and is therefore 
used as a mental management skill in the physical education curriculum (Hall & Fishburne, 
2010). In a typical intervention, a coach might ask the athlete to mentally practice the task 
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with positive outcomes before the actual performance for increasing self-confidence (Bertollo, 
Saltarelli, & Robazza, 2009; Hall, & Fishburne, (2010; Munroe-Chandler, Hall, & Fishburne, 
2008). Such interventions have indeed been shown to help athletes to prepare and cope with 
the general atmosphere of the competition day (Hall, Rodgers & Barr, 1990).  
Other general benefits arise from the use of mental practice to control attention focusing and 
refocusing. For example, before throwing a dart, coaches might instruct the athlete to picture 
the centre of the board and make it as large as possible in their mind. Evidence suggests that 
such practice, especially when directed towards the intended goals of the action, leads to 
direct performance improvements, increasing outcomes and reducing cognitive demands on 
motor control (for a review, see Wulf, 2007). 
Another use is the correction of potential errors before task execution. Before attempting a 
high jump, for example, the coach might ask the athlete to mentally practice the approach 
towards the bar and to image running towards it without actually taking a jump. This allows 
the athlete to focus and calculate an accurate run-up before the actual attempt. If the athlete 
feels that the last step is too close to the bar, then he or she moves his/her starting point back 
a few inches. If the athlete feels that the last step is too far away from the bar, he/she moves it 
forward. It usually takes several (mental) attempts to find the exactly right starting point.    
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, mental practice has been shown to have powerful 
effects on skill learning and the acquisition of motor tasks, both when used in the 
performance situation and when used outside of it. It is effective across a broad range of 
skills, ranging from simple manual movements to expert movements in sports, such as diving, 
swimming, or golf (e.g., Grouious, 1992; Martin & Hall, 1995; Noel, 1980; for meta-analyses, 
see Feltz, Landers, & Becker, 1988; Hinshaw, 1991). Overall, mental practice has been 
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shown to be superior to no practice, but not as effective as physical practice (Feltz & Landers, 
1983; Allami, Paulignan, Brovelli, & Boussaoud, 2008). Still, some skills benefit more from 
mental rather than physical training (Wohldmann, Healy, & Bourne, 2008), and generally the 
greatest performance improvements arise when mental and physical practice are combined 
(Hall and Fishburne, 2010). Various studies have shown that mental practice not only 
facilitates performer’s cognitive representations of the skill, but also helps their 
automatization (Sackett, 1934). For these reasons, more than 90% of professional athletes and 
94% of coaches now incorporate mental practice in their training regimes (Jowdy, Murphy, & 
Durtschi, 1989), and it is increasingly used in other fields as well, such as surgery, music 
performance, and rehabilitation after stroke (e.g., Arora et al., 2011; Ross, 1985; 
Zimmermann-Schlatter, Schuster, Puhan, Siekierka & Steurer, 2008). Finally, the benefits of 
mental practice appear be related to the benefits of observational learning and imitation, and 
the effectiveness of mental practice can be enhanced when it is supported by video 
demonstrations of the skill (e.g., Hall and Erffmeyer, 1983). 
                                                            
1.2. From Symbolic to Embodied Theories of Mental Practice  
 
Despite much research on the benefits of mental practice, it is very much unclear on what 
processes mental practice relies and how these benefits emerge. Over the years, different 
theories have been proposed, which can be broadly distinguished between abstract/symbolic 
and embodied accounts of mental practice.  
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1.3. Symbolic Views of Mental Practice   
  
Early conceptions arose from the view that the mind is an abstract information processor (for 
discussion, see Anderson, 2003; Holt and Beilock, 2006; Purves et al., 2008; Sprague, 
Ballard & Robinson 2007; Wilson, 2002). Motor skills were similarly seen to be based on 
abstract descriptions or semantic mental models. For example, according to schema theory, 
motor skills are based on abstract representations stored in memory, which are retrieved in 
the performance situation to function as controller images of the motor apparatus (see Annett, 
1996; Schmidt, 2003). Complex motor skills were assumed to be organized in a tree-like 
structure that subdivide the phases of a motor action, and control the different postures that 
are required in each stage. 
The trees have been shown to indeed have a cognitive foundation. In a recent example, 
Weigelt, Ahlmeyer, Lex, & Schack, (2011) used structure dimension analysis to reveal the 
cognitive representation of the judo throw uchi mata in judo expert. They showed that the 
skill is represented in a distinctive hierarchical tree like structure in long term memory, 
consisting of fourteen parts, which can be subdivided in preparation phase, the main throwing 
phase and the final phrase (see Figure 1.1). Importantly, they could show that problems in 
these cognitive representations of the skills coincided with similar problems when performing 
the associated motor actions. 
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Figure1.1 Tree like structure in the representation of the Uchi-Mata judo throwing. Figure re-
created based on Weigelt, Ahlmeyer, Lex, & Schack, (2011). The start of the movement is on 
the right side. 
In such views, mental practice was seen as an abstract, symbolic process, which operated on 
these mental models, allowing these models to be re-structured, sharpened and refined. For 
example, Richardson (1967) defined mental practice as ‘the symbolic rehearsal of a physical 
activity in the absence of any gross muscular movements’. In such views, the benefits of 
mental practice emerge because it supports cognitive (re-) structuring of the action plans, by 
providing ease of access to the different nodes in their hierarchical structure, or facilitating 
the chunking and sequencing of action units (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994; Minas, 1978; Sackett, 
1934). Indeed, consistent with such cognitive views of motor skills and mental practice, 
several meta-analyses have revealed that mental practice has larger effects on tasks with a 
strong cognitive component compared to purely motor tasks (e.g., Feltz & Landers, 1983; 
Hird et al., 1991; Lohse, Healy, & Sherwood 2010; Ryan & Simons, 1983).  
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1.4. Embodied Views of Mental Practice  
 
Recent research has challenged these symbolic views of mental practice, revealing that 
mental practice can directly affect not only cognitive skill representations, but also core 
motoric or physiological variables of performance. For example, Wohldman, Healy and 
Bourne (2007, 2008) have shown that mentally practicing button press sequences speeds up 
not only subsequent motor planning times (measured by the time it took participants to 
initiate a motor sequence), but also their motor execution times (measured by the time it took 
participants to fully execute the motor sequence). The authors argued that the latter result 
revealed a direct impact on motor execution, rather than planning.  
Other studies revealed impacts on physiological performance measures. Page, Szaflarski, 
Eliassen, Pan, and Cramer (2009) provided evidence that mental practice supports the cortical 
re-organization of motor cortices after stroke. Roure et al. (1999) revealed that changes in 
heart rate during mental practice predicted subsequent improvement in volleyball. Perhaps 
most strikingly, mental imagery of finger and arm movements is enough to improve the 
physical strength of these movements, when measured later during physical training (Reiser, 
Büsch, & Munzert, 2011; Yue & Cole, 1992). Such results have provided converging 
evidence that mental practice does not – as predicted from symbolic accounts – merely 
affects the cognitive representation of motor skills, but affects the motor and bodily systems 
itself, leading to various improvements and benefits. 
This has lead to the development of embodied or enactive accounts of mental practice. 
Embodied accounts assume that mental practice is at least partially ‘enactive’ and rooted in 
the processes guiding actual motor execution. Accordingly, mental practice involves visual 
and kinaesthetic motor imagery that allows people to ‘simulate’ the sensory input that would 
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occur during physical execution (e.g., Decety, 1996; Jeannerod, 2001). These simulations are 
assumed to be based on processes that occur, in very similar form, also during the physical 
performance of the actions. For example, Annett (1996) assumed that the mental images 
during mental practice reflect the controller signals that would be sent to the motor systems 
during each stage of an action’s execution (see also, Jeannerod, 1995; Vogt, 1996). Jeannerod 
and Frak (1999) proposed that they were generated by a ‘subliminal activation’ of the motor 
apparatus that plays through the mentally simulated actions. Newer accounts assume that they 
emerge from internal models that, during action execution, generate visual and kinaesthetic 
predictions of movement outcomes (e.g., Grush, 2004; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).  
Evidence for enactive accounts comes mostly from studies investigating motor imagery 
outside of a mental practice context (that is, imagery of action without the explicit goal of 
improving subsequent performance). Several studies have provided evidence that mental 
imagery activates the muscular system even in the absence of physical movement (see Guillot 
et al., 2007; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; Hale, 2003; Rodrigues et al., 2010). Electromyographic 
(EMG) studies provided a key piece of evidence. Jacobson demonstrated already in 1930 that 
imagery of movement is accompanied by subtle activity in those muscles that are typically 
used to perform the movement, consistent with Jeannerod and Frak’s idea of subliminal 
motor system activation (see Guillot et al., 2007, for more recent findings). In a more recent 
example, Lebon, Rouffet, Collet and Guillot (2008) asked participants to lift or to imagine 
lifting a weighted dumbbell. They measured the muscle activation in three muscles, the 
Biceps long head, the Biceps short head and Triceps brachii. They found a significantly 
increased EMG activity in all muscles during motor imagery than during rest. Results such as 
these show that the motor system is engaged during mental practice, suggesting that it is 
either involved in generating the associated imagery experiences, or activated as a 
consequence of imagery. 
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Further support for motor contributions to motor imagery comes from studies showing that 
the timing of mental imagery closely follows the timing of the actual movements (e.g., 
Decety & Michel, 1989; Landauer, 1962; MacKay, 1981; but see Reed, 2002). For example, 
in an early study, Decety and Michel (1989) asked participants to write a sentence and to 
draw a cube. Their findings showed that, in writing movements, the temporal patterns in both 
mental and actual conditions are very similar, both when comparing between subjects and 
when comparing across trials in an experimental run. Studies such as these further support the 
notion of a motoric involvement in mental practice, and reveal close links between physical 
motor performance and motor imagery. 
Another piece of evidence that supports embodied accounts of mental practice is that 
people’s ability to mentally rotate body parts depends on these body parts not being engaged 
in a different movement (e.g., De Lange, Helmich, & Toni, 2006; Ionta, Perruchoud, 
Draganski & Blanke, 2012; Ionta, Fourkas, Fiorio, & Aglioti, 2007; Wohlschläger, 2001; 
Wohlschläger, & Wohlschläger, 1998). In a recent study, Ionta et al. (2007) studied whether 
changes of hands posture influence the mental rotation of hands and feet. They found that 
mental rotation of hands but not feet was influenced by changes in hands posture. Similarly, 
Wohlschläger, & Wohlschläger (1998) showed that utilizing hands in similar or different 
movements impairs or facilitates people ability to mentally rotate imagined objects. Such 
studies show that the motoric involvement in motor imagery is not only epiphenomenal, but 
of functional importance, such that interfering with the motor system leads to associated 
effects on motor imagery performance.  
Finally, a host of neurophysiological studies shows that imagery of movement goes along 
with activity in brain regions directly involved in motor control and planning, such as the 
premotor and motor cortices, the supplementary motor areas, as well as the parietal lobe (e.g., 
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Miller et al., 2010; Naito et al., 2002; Porro et al., 1996; for reviews, see de Lange, Roelofs, 
& Toni, 2008; Lotze & Halsband, 2006). Miller et al. (2010) investigated overt action and 
kinaesthetic imagery and measured this with EEG source localization. They had four types of 
body movements (shoulder, hands, tongue and speech) across three factors of performance: 
movement, imagery and feedback. They found that motor imagery and actual performance of 
a motor skill show overlapping activity in somatotopically distributed motor areas.Similar 
motor activations – and behavioural responses – have been observed when people watch 
others act, prompting the idea that similar processes of motor simulation are also engaged 
during action observation, and could account for both automatic and goal-directed acts of 
imitation (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Prinz, 2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; for a review, see Iacoboni, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
11 
 
1.5. Problems of Embodied Accounts  
 
Despite this broad support for enactive theories of motor imagery, the involvement of 
enactive processes in mental practice is still debated. As noted, one reason is that there is a 
scarcity of studies directly linking motor engagement to mental practice: cases where 
participants did not only have to imagine movement, but where this imagery was used to 
improve later performance. In addition, even the data on motor imagery outside of a mental 
practice context is far from equivocal and leaves many questions unanswered.  
For example, several studies now suggest that motor activity during imagery is primarily 
found when participants imagine themselves from the 1
st
 rather than the 3
rd
 person 
perspective (e.g., Lorey et al., 2009), and when they are instructed to focus on the 
kinaesthetic sensations going along with the actions rather than just the visually perceivable 
effects (e.g., Stinear et al., 2006). Often, these forms of mental practice require explicit 
training and are not spontaneously used by participants (e.g., Lotze et al., 1999). Motor 
involvement during motor imagery and mental practice may therefore be far from a general 
phenomenon, but may be restricted to specific circumstances.  
Even in cases of kinaesthetic egocentric imagery, various studies report either only very 
transient or complete absence of actual motor (rather than pre-motor) activation (e.g., 
Dechent, Merbold, Frahm, 2004; Macuga & Frey, 2012; for a review, see Lotze & Halsband, 
2006), or even striking dissociations (e.g., Hanakawa, Dimyan, & Hallett, 2008; Reed, 2002). 
As an instructive example, amputees sometimes report the feeling of being able to control 
their phantom-limbs, a phenomenological experience that contrasts starkly with and appears 
more “real” than imagery of movement. A neuroimaging study confirmed this dissociation, 
with brain activity during phantom-limb movements being virtually identical with actual 
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movements, but strikingly different to imagined movements. More specifically, primary 
motor cortex was activated during actual movement of phantom limbs while premotor 
context was activated during imagined movement of phantom limbs (Raffin, Mattout, Reilly, 
& Giraux, 2012) This indicates that motor execution and imagery do dissociate, even when 
the actual movements and the kinaesthetic feedback are controlled.  
Finally, even in studies that do report motor activation, it is often not clear what the role of 
this activation is, the evidence being subject to various interpretations. First, it has been 
argued that the observed motor effects during action simulation are purely epiphenomenal – a 
downstream consequence brought about by associations between cognitive control and motor 
areas – rather than the basis of mental practice processes (for discussion, see Jeannerod, 1994; 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Second, the possibility has been raised that the reported motor 
activations may reflect action planning processes rather than execution processes (e.g., 
Hanakawa, Dimyan, & Hallett, 2008), a suggestion further supported by the more robust 
involvement of premotor rather than motor cortices in motor imagery (for a review, see Lotze 
& Halsband, 2006). And third, they may reflect the inhibition of motor output prohibited by 
the task rather than an excitation of the relevant motor structures, and data from a fMRI 
functional connectivity study indeed reveals an inhibitory influence of action planning areas 
onto the motor cortex (Solodkin et al., 2004).  
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1.6. Summary and Conclusions  
 
Mental practice is a key research interest for the fields of motor control, sports psychology 
and education. However, the mechanisms underpinning it are still very much unclear. Neither 
symbolic nor embodied theories can fully account for the observed results. Symbolic 
accounts struggle with the findings that mental practice has direct effects on physiological or 
motoric measures. Embodied accounts, in contrast, have problems explaining why mental 
practice predominantly benefits skills with a strong cognitive component. In the following we 
will introduce a novel way of looking at mental practice – based on ideomotor theories of 
action planning – that combine embodied and symbolic accounts, and may therefore be able 
to provide a fuller explanation of the available data. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
Ideomotor Theories of Action Planning and  
their Application to Mental Practice 
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2.1 Ideomotor Theories of Action Planning    
 
Ideomotor theories have been developed to account for how humans can plan and execute 
actions that are not passively triggered (only) by affording stimuli in the environment, but by 
their own intentions (i.e. volitional instead of stimulus-driven actions). At the core of these 
theories is therefore the question of how abstract intentions can be transformed into concrete 
movements that realize these goals in the current circumstances (cf. Greenwald, 1970; 
Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997). This is not a trivial question. To achieve such a translation 
of intentions to action, the brain faces several difficulties (for a review, see Wolpert & 
Kawato, 1998). The body has a large number of joints, which can support a wide range of 
movement at many angles. Even simple acts like grasping require the use of multiple muscles, 
some not located in the arm or hand, to be coordinated for maintaining and control through 
the reach. People are typically not consciously aware of the specific muscles required to 
perform any given action, and have only limited access as to which joints to move in 
precisely what way. These problems are worsened by the fact that there are typically multiple 
ways for humans or animals to perform a movement in order to achieve the same goal (the 
“degree of freedom” problem, see Wolpert & Kawato, 1998, for a review). Thus, there is no 
simple match between a desired outcome and the motoric solution.  
The question therefore is how does the brain achieve the fluent and effortless control of 
action, given the complexities involved? How does a fully formed competent action emerge 
out of intentions that people might not even be fully aware of? 
Ideomotor models solve this problem by assuming that actions are not planned motorically, 
and that they therefore do not require the (explicit) control this large number of degrees of 
freedom. Rather, in ideomotor theories, movements are assumed to be controlled on the 
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perceptual level: by the outcome they are intended to achieve. Actions are coded in terms of 
the effects they are predicted to evoke: how the action will look, sound and feel if 
successfully carried out. James (1890) described it as follows: “our idea of raising our arm… 
or crooking our finger is a sense […] of how the raised arm or the crooked finger feels” 
(James, 1890, p. 499). Or later in the same text: “there need be nothing else, and that in 
perfectly simple voluntary acts there is nothing else, in the mind but the kinesthetic idea, thus 
defined, of what the act is to be.” In other words, rather than having to specify all the motoric 
parameters required for successful actions, humans can simply imagine them. The task of 
translating these action images into a fully specified motor plan is out-sourced to automatic 
motor control processes that happen mostly outside of consciousness. 
 
2.2. Learning Action Planning through Self-Observation 
 
This then raises the question how the ability to control the motor system through the 
anticipation of action outcome arises? Ideomotor theories propose a simple association 
between motor commands and perceptual effects that arises through self-observation (Prinz, 
1997; Hommel et al., 2001; Elsner & Hommel, 2001). When infants first produce their first 
motor commands, they have no knowledge yet about the outcomes these commands will 
produce. However, as soon as they make their first movements – randomly, due to the lack of 
knowledge what outcomes his motor commands will produce –, motor commands can be 
associated with their typical effects. The infant may learn, for example that a certain motor 
command brings about horizontal movements of the arm that others lead to the opening of its 
grip, and so on. Over time, the infant therefore learns to associate different perceptual effects 
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– the opening of a grip, the varying orientations of a hand, its possible positions in space – 
with the motor commands required to achieve these effects.  
The key insight of ideomotor models of action is that as soon as such associations are 
acquired, movement comes under cognitive control (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). If outcome 
sensory effect and motor command are associated bi-directionally, not only does activating a 
motor command prime associated sensory effects, but, conversely, the activation of a sensory 
effect can activate the associated motor commands. Sensory action images can then be used – 
via these sensorimotor associations –for the control of actions. As a consequence, infants can 
now simply “think of” or imagine the perceptual effects to trigger the associated motor 
behaviors. Thus, thinking of the arm in a certain orientation, with a certain grip, in a specific 
position in space may trigger the associated motor commands, and, in turn, real movement 
that matches this goal specification.  
The first study to provide evidence for this notion was conducted by Elsner and Hommel 
(2001). In a first block, participants pressed buttons as a response to a visual stimulus. 
Whenever such a response was made, and contingent on which button was pressed, different 
tones were played to the participants (i.e. high tone for left key, low tone for right key), 
leading to a co-occurrence of actions with sensory outcomes. In a subsequent test phase, 
participants were asked to press the same buttons again. However, now the tones that 
previously followed their actions, were now presented just before movement selection, acting 
as primes. The authors reported that participants’ responses were faster when the preceding 
tone had previously been the consequence of this action. This supports the notion that the 
perception of the tone activated the corresponding motor program, in line with the idea that 
sensory consequences of actions learned in the first block can serve as cues for action 
planning after learning. 
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2.3. Evidence for Ideomotor Theories Stimulus Response Compatibility  
 
In ideomotor theories, movements are planned on a perceptual level, in terms of their directly 
perceivable consequences (their effects). This means that the codes use to describe one’s own 
possible actions are, at least partially, the same as the codes describing actions of other 
people, or, the codes describing other, inanimate stimuli in the environment. For example, the 
same code that represents the orientation of a bar in front of you would also be used as 
possible goal state for the orientation of your own hand (cf. Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001; 
Bach, Griffiths, Weigelt, & Tipper, 2010).  
One prediction of ideomotor theories is therefore that any activation of a sensory effect, 
either endogenously or exogenously, may trigger the corresponding action. (Shin, Proctor & 
Capaldi, 2010). William James (1890) defined this type of ideomotor behaviour as follows: 
“We may then lay it down for certain that every representation of a movement awakens in 
some degree the actual movement which is the object; and awakens it in a maximum degree 
whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation present 
simultaneously to the mind.” Thus, whenever we see or even imagine things in the 
environment that are similar to such an effect image we could use to control our own 
movements might cause these movements to be triggered automatically, or at least primed, if 
they are not actively inhibited. 
There is ample evidence for such an automatic translation of perceptual stimuli features into 
motor actions. These effects are typically investigated with stimulus response compatibility 
experiments. A classic example is the Simon task. Participants see stimuli appearing on the 
left and right side of the screen. However, the stimulus position is task irrelevant; they only 
have to attend to the stimulus color. Participants are instructed to press a left key, for example, 
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if the stimulus is blue, and a right hand key if the stimulus is red. The Simon effect refers to 
the robust finding that reaction time will be faster when response and stimulus are in a 
compatible (similar) location (Simon and Rudell, 1976; Simon and Small, 1969; for review, 
see Hommel, 2010). Thus, participants are faster in pressing a button with the left hand, if 
they see a stimulus that is also on the left. When participants respond with the right hand, 
they are faster when they see a stimulus that is also on the right side. 
Another example comes from Kunde (2001). Subjects perform either soft or forceful presses 
on a touch – sensitive plate. Each key press produces either a quiet or loud tone, respectively. 
Consistent with ideomotor theory, in blocks of trials in which the to-be-produce tone effect 
always matched the to-be-produced manual key press in intensity (e.g., soft press resulting in 
a quiet tone), response times were faster than in blocks in which the intensity of the tone 
effect always did not match the response intensity. Similar effects have now been reported for 
various stimulus features, such as orientation (Craighero et al., 1999) or shape (Bach et al., 
2010). 
Compatibility tasks have also been used to study how seeing somebody else do an action 
affects own responses. Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger and Prinz (2000) studied the 
compatibility when participants saw either an index or a middle finger being lifted on the 
screen, and when participants had to make the same movements themselves. They revealed 
that participants reacted faster to compatible trials (same finger lifted as on the screen) than to 
incompatible trials (different finger). Similarly, Bach, Peatfield, and Tipper (2007) studied 
observation of actions that were performed with different body sites: feet (kicking a soccer 
ball) and fingers (typing on computer keyboard). It was found that participants were 
significantly faster and more accurate for responding with the foot when seeing the kicking 
action and finger responses were faster and more accurate when seeing the typing action. 
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In summary, there is considerable evidence for claim of ideomotor theories that movement 
imagery – representations of movements coded in perceptual terms – is a key step in action 
planning, before executing the actual performance. Due to the perceptual coding of the 
movement plans, actions can be activated by various forms of imagery, such as movement 
intentions, but also by external stimuli, such as the spatial properties of an object or the 
actions of other people. This can explain the various reported mimicry phenomena. For 
example, when persons watch their favourite basketball team they may feel that their arms 
move in correspondence during a throw (e.g., Knuf, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999). 
 
2.4. Evidence for Ideomotor Theories: Action Effect Binding 
 
These common codes for perceptual and motor events cause a problem. The question is how, 
given these distributed codes for motor actions, they become unified into action plans, and 
distinguished from one another. Consider that all actions involve features of several different 
kinds, which might be coded in different brain systems. Effective throws for example, require 
actors to coordinate plans for ball trajectories, hand and arm movements, and even 
movements of the feet, in order to enable a stable stance. Even planning a simple grasp 
involves the anticipation of kinesthetic feedback from the arm and hand, visual feedback 
from the hand as it moves through the visual field, and even more temporally distant features, 
such as the texture of the goal object, once it is grasped. The question is therefore how these 
different features that are coded in different brain systems are unified and at the same time 
kept apart from the potentially similar features of the simultaneously perceived visual 
environment. This potential for confusion is increased because actions often strongly overlap 
in time and we often carry out more than one action at the same time, such as when talking on 
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the cell phone while driving. Finally, many tasks – such as catching a ball – require the 
coordination of perceptual input and motor output, further increasing the need to both 
distinguish and integrate various sensory codes, some coding actions, some stimuli in the 
environment. 
The Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001) differs from previous ideomotor accounts 
of action planning in that it recognizes this potential problem, and provides one solution. 
According to this theory, one function of action planning is to “bind” all the features 
belonging to one action into one concrete action plan that remains active until the action is 
executed. This binding is assumed to keep the current plan active and maintains its relevant 
details, but separates it from other plans, and other competing stimuli in the environment. 
Indeed, there are now various studies that confirm that planning an action with certain 
features (e.g., a left or a right response, or the use of feet or hands) renders this code less 
available for other processes, causing inhibition (for a review, see Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). For example, planning a specific movement (i.e. button press 
on the left side) makes it harder to execute responses that are similar to this response but 
serve another goal and are therefore part of another action plan, causing response time costs 
(Stoet & Hommel, 1999). Similarly, Müsseler & Hommel (1997) demonstrated that codes 
used in a planned action are not available to visual perception, rendering stimuli that are 
similar to the planned action less easy to see. When the planning stage is over and the action 
is actually executed, these effects disappear, linking the effects directly to action planning 
rather than motor execution (Wühr & Müsseler, 2001). Similar effects are known from the 
task- switching literature. If a participant’s goal stays the same between trials, they find it 
easier to repeat a movement that they had just executed. If, however, their action goal 
changed, different movement are easier to execute (e.g., Schuch & Koch, 2004). Again, for 
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these response-repetition costs to be observed, it was relevant that the prior movements were 
merely planned, not that they were physically executed (Hübner & Druey, 2006; Schuch & 
Koch, 2010).  
 
2.5. An Ideomotor Account of Mental Practice 
 
In summary, according to ideomotor theories, sensory features of actions are associated to 
motor commands that bring these features about, such that simply imagining an action – both 
visually and kinaesthetically – is enough to trigger the associated actions. Actions are 
therefore planned on a perceptual level. Action planning describes the cognitive activity of 
specifying the relevant sensory features of the intended action, and integrating or “binding” 
them into a unique action plan. This plan can then guide automatic motor processes that 
convert these motor images into physical action, without requiring any explicit further 
involvement (cf. Hommel, et al., 2001). 
We believe that such a model of action planning provides a promising framework for 
conceptualizing mental practice. In its most simple form, mental practice – 
motor/kinaesthetic imagery with the goal of improving subsequent performance – can be seen 
as the creation of the action plans itself, without releasing the associated motor movements. 
In other words, in such views, mental practice would be identical with the processes of action 
planning: the formation of concrete motor plans that contain all the necessary sensory 
features for successful performance of the action. These action plans can then be retrieved 
and executed in the actual performance situation. 
Such a view would fit well with several observations about mental practice. First, for 
example, as noted, mental practice is not always decoupled in time from the performance 
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situation. In many cases, athletes play through their performance in their mind, immediately 
before initiating it. This type of “pre-performance imagery” (Morris et al., 2005) is very 
much identical with how action planning is typically understood, especially in ideomotor 
models, which conceive as action planning as primarily perceptual or imagery-related mental 
activity, similar to how mental practice is typically described. 
Second, while mental practice has direct benefits on motor execution (Wohldmann et al., 
2007; 2008) it is known that mental practice is most effective when it is applied to tasks with 
a strong cognitive component. If mental practice is conceptualized in terms of planning 
(rather than execution) processes, such a finding is plausible. Action planning similarly can 
be seen to be located at the intersection of cognitive and motor processes. It can be 
understood as the processes that transform relatively abstract intentional states into, 
potentially very complex, motor plans that realize these goals. It should therefore be 
particularly helpful where the plans are complex, and require the coordination of motor 
programs across different stages, consistent with meta analyses that have revealed the 
strongest impacts of mental practice on such tasks (e.g., Feltz & Landers, 1983).  
Third and finally, such views that conceptualize mental practice in terms of action planning 
provide a better fit with the neurophysiological data than current models that primarily rely 
on execution (rather than planning related) motor processes. As noted, while some studies 
indeed reveal an engagement of primary motor cortices during mental practice (associated 
with the engagement of motor execution related processes), the more robust finding concerns 
an engagement of premotor areas (associated with action planning) (e.g., Dechent, Merbold, 
Frahm, 2004; Macuga & Frey, 2012; for a review, see Lotze & Halsband, 2006). Moreover, the 
emerging dissociations between motor imagery and motor execution (e.g., Hanakawa, Dimyan, 
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& Hallett, 2008; Reed, 2002) are consistent with such views, specifically with an overlap of 
planning related processes during motor imagery.  
The experiments in the following sections are designed to provide a first behavioral test of 
whether mental practice is indeed best understood (a) in terms of execution related processes 
that are reactivated during imagery (e.g., Jeannerod & Frak, 1999), or whether (b) action 
planning related actions provide the better description.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing a Compatibility Task  
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3.1. Developing a Compatibility Task to Investigate Motor Involvement in 
Mental Practice 
 
The aim of Experiments 1 to 4 is to develop a robust behavioural paradigm that allows us to 
directly investigate the potential motor mechanisms underlying mental practice. Two main 
goals guide the present investigation. The first goal is to test whether mental practice 
generally engages general processes that are also involved in the actual planning and 
execution of the motor skill, as suggested by prior studies on motor imagery. Importantly, 
this should be demonstrated in a task that has sufficient motor complexity to benefit from 
mental practice, but in which participants are neither instructed nor trained to use 1
st
 person 
kinaesthetic motor imagery, which is known to by itself produce a bias towards motor 
involvement but which is not naturally used by participants. The second goal is to resolve the 
functional role of this motor activation. Is it facilitatory or inhibitory? Does it reflect the 
simulated execution of the action, or is it better conceptualized in terms of action planning 
and action effect binding?  
To develop such a paradigm, we adapted the well-established stimulus-response 
compatibility (SRC) tasks. These tasks are typically used to investigate how overt, visual 
stimuli affect motor output. For example, the classic Simon task tests whether seeing a 
stimulus on the left or right side primes responses with the left or right side, respectively 
(Simon and Rudell, 1976; Simon and Small, 1969; for a recent review, see Hommel, 2010). It 
is typically found that participants are faster when side of the response and of the stimulus are 
the same. Similar effects have now been observed for various stimulus and response classes, 
such as hand/object orientation, object/grip size, and object shape/hand trajectory (Bach, 
Griffiths, & Tipper, 2010; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; 2001). 
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SRC tasks have also been used to study how action observation automatically affects motor 
output. In a seminal study, Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger and Prinz (2000) studied how 
responding with middle and index fingers is affected by the simultaneous observation of 
index or middle movements (see also, Bertenthal, Longo & Kosobud, 2006). Again, 
participants responded more quickly when their own response mirrored the action they saw. 
Similar data come from a study by Bach, Peatfield, and Tipper (2007), which showed that 
such effects can be observed on a more general level, relating to the body parts – hands and 
feet – used in action and perception, irrespective of whether these body parts are used to carry 
out the same actions as the observed person (see also Gillmeister et al., 2008).  
The present experiments adapt the general SRC paradigm to study how actions that are 
merely mentally practiced – in order to train them for later performance – affect one’s own 
motor output. The general design of the experiments was as follows. Participants were 
presented with symbolic descriptions of complex rhythms (ABABB…). They were instructed 
to mentally practice these rhythms, in order to fluently produce them afterwards with either 
their hands or their feet. While they practiced the rhythms, one of two sounds was played to 
participants, prompting them to either make a simple key-press with either their hands or 
their feet. These key-presses are unrelated to the main task of mentally practicing the rhythms, 
but involve either the same or different body parts as those used for mentally practicing the 
rhythm. They therefore allow us to probe whether mental practice engages the foot- and 
hand-specific motor pathways that would also be utilized during physical execution. If this is 
the case, then the efficiency of these unrelated hand or foot responses should depend on 
whether participants are using the same or a different body part for mentally practicing the 
rhythms.  
28 
 
Such an effect can take one of two forms. First, as is the case for many prior studies 
investigating perception-behavior links (e.g., Bach et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000; Simon & 
Rudell, 1976), using a body part for mental practice might facilitate responding with this 
body part to the sounds. Such a finding would support the idea that mental practice engages 
processes similar to the actual execution of the rhythms. In particular, it would support the 
idea that mental practice involves a subtle activation of the motor programs or the muscles 
used in the trained action, which predisposes participants for responses with these body parts 
(cf. Jacobsen, 1930; James, 1890; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999). 
Second, however, mental practice with a body part could also impair the usage of the body 
part for other responses. Such an outcome might appear particularly likely if one assumes that 
mental practice relies on the processes involved in action planning rather than motor 
execution. As described in the previous chapter, planning an action involves specifying how 
the action would look and feel if it were successful. Actors may specify, for example, the 
body part to be used, or the speed, direction and the trajectory of the intended movement, as 
well as its tactile consequences. There is now evidence from various fields that the selection 
of those action features has direct behavioural consequences. The data indicates that the 
codes for those features become ‘bound’ to the action plan until it is executed, and are, in the 
meantime, less available to other processes, perhaps to shield the action them from 
interference (for a review, see Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). It has been 
found, for example, that merely planning a specific movement (i.e. planning to make button 
press on the left side) makes it harder to execute responses – and even to perceive stimuli – 
that have the same features as this planned response (e.g., detecting stimuli on the left or 
using other body parts on the left side; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Stoet & Hommel, 1999). 
Importantly, these effects are planning and not execution-related: they are found as long as an 
action is planned, but disappear after it is physically executed (Wühr & Müsseler, 2001).  
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If mental practice is based on these action planning processes, then a similar linkage of 
responses to action plans should be found in the present experiments. Such an account 
therefore predicts negative – rather than positive – compatibility effects: mentally practicing a 
rhythm with the hand should impair one’s use of the hands when responding to the sounds, 
and mentally practicing with the foot should impair responses with the foot. 
 
3.1.1 Experiment 1 – Developing a Basic Paradigm 
 
Experiment 1 provides a first behavioural test of whether mental practice of a motor skill 
relies on the same mechanisms as the actual execution of the skill. Participants were 
presented with different complex rhythms that they had to mentally practice (while keeping 
completely still) so that they could perform these rhythms later from memory, using either 
their hands or feet. Within the mental practice interval, we played different sounds that 
participants had to respond to with speeded hand and foot responses. We investigated 
whether participants’ ability to make these hand and foot responses was affected by whether 
these body parts were used for mentally practicing the rhythms.  
As noted, such an effect can take one of two forms. If mental practice involves a subliminal 
activation of motor commands or muscles used in the actual action, then positive 
compatibility effects should be observed: responses with the body parts that are used for 
mental practice should be easier than responses with a different body part. In contrast, if 
mental practice involves a binding of motor codes to action plans, then resource competition 
should occur: responses with the body part used in mental practice should be harder to make 
than responses with the other body part. 
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3.1.2 Method 
 
Participants. Twenty students (five male, age range: 18-27) took part in the experiment. They 
gave informed consent approved by the School of Psychology Ethics Committee at Plymouth 
University. Participants were paid either at a rate of £6/hour or they received course credits. 
They satisfied all requirements in volunteer screening: all participants were in good health, 
had no history of disease or medical treatment that might influence motor or visuomotor 
functions. In this and all following experiments, participants were excluded from the analysis 
when they produced invalid rhythms in the execution interval (rhythms 50% longer/shorter 
than the required rhythm length) or invalid responses to the tones (responses were made 
before the tones were played, or responses for which the press of only one or no response key 
was detected) in more than 20% of the trials. Of the 20 participants tested, this was the case 
for four participants. 
Materials and apparatus. The experiment was controlled by the experimental control 
software Presentation (www.neurobs.com), running on a 2.0 GHz PC running Windows XP. 
Foot responses were recorded with two foot pedals (33 cm apart), which were attached to the 
floor with black tape, and connected to the computer via the parallel port. Hand response 
keys were the Ctrl-key (operated by participants’ left hand) and the Enter key on the number 
block (operated by the right hand). Sounds were played via an external loudspeaker system.  
Twenty different rhythms were created for the experiment. Ten of these rhythms were to be 
played with the left and right hands and ten rhythms (mirror images of the first 10 rhythms) 
were to be played with the left and right feet. All rhythms were presented in a symbolic 
format consisting of 16 lines, each line corresponding to the click of an imagined metronome. 
The beats that participants had to produce were represented by As on the left and Bs on the 
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right side of each line. As on the left side represented button presses or foot pedal presses on 
the left hand side, while Bs on the right side represented presses with the right foot or right 
key (see Appendix A for a list of the rhythms). A line containing both an A and a B 
designated cases in which both feet or both hands should be pressed. To the left and the right 
of each rhythm, a symbol depicting either a hand or a foot was shown, reminding participants 
of the body part with which this rhythm would have to be played. 
Two sounds were used as cues for the participants‟ responses in the memorization/mental 
practice interval: a high sound (sine wave of 1331 Hz) or a low sound (sine wave of 223 Hz). 
Both sounds lasted 100 ms. and were faded in and out at the start and end.  
Procedure and design. The participants were seated in a dimly lit room, facing a computer at 
a distance of approximately 60 cm. The experiment contained three training sessions that 
lasted about 20 minutes altogether, each consisting of eight trials. The experiment proper 
took about 36 minutes, resulting in a total experiment time of roughly 55 minutes. The 
participants were tested individually and instructed by the software and the experimenter.  
The first training session introduced the participants to the (difficult) task of tapping the 
rhythms. In each of the eight trials, participants were first presented with a cue telling them 
which effectors (hands or feet) they had to use to produce a rhythm. This cue remained on the 
screen for 2000 ms and read “Produce the following rhythm with the hands/feet!” After a 
short blank (300 ms), the rhythm was shown on the monitor (see Figure 1, middle frame, for 
an example). Pictures to its left and right reminded participants of the body part they had to 
use to produce it. Participants then produced this rhythm while it was on the screen. They had 
11200 ms to tap the rhythm. 
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The second training session introduced participants to the mental training component of the 
task. In each trial, participants were again first presented (for 2000 ms) with a cue specifying 
the body parts (hands or feet) they should use to mentally train the following rhythm (Figure 
3.1, left panel). After a short blank (300 ms), they were then shown one of the 20 rhythms 
that they had to mentally practice for 10200 ms, while not making any overt movement 
(Figure 3.1, middle panel). The rhythm description remained on the screen in this interval. 
After another blank (800 ms), a cue saying “Now produce the rhythm!” appeared. 
Participants now played the rhythm from memory with the body part that was previously 
instructed. They were reminded of this body part with small pictures appearing on the screen 
(see Figure 3.1, right panel), but the rhythm itself was not presented again, requiring 
performance from memory. They had 9200 ms. to tap the rhythm.  
 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of the trial sequence in Experiment 1. The trial instruction (left panel) 
informed participants about the body part they had to mentally practice the rhythm with. In 
the mental practice interval (middle panel), participants were instructed to keep completely 
still while they mentally trained the rhythm. In this interval, they responded with hands or 
feet to sounds played after 5000, 5500, 6000, or 6500 ms after the start of this interval. In the 
execution interval (right panel) they executed the rhythm from memory.  
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The third training session introduced participants to the secondary task (responding to the 
sounds) and was identical to the actual experiment (see Figure 1 for a schematic). The trials 
in the third training session were identical to the second training session, with the exception 
that low and high tones were played after 5000, 5500, 6000 or 6500 ms from the start of the 
mental practice interval. The participants’ task was to press both foot pedals as quickly as 
possible when hearing the low tone, and both hand keys when hearing the high tone. As 
before, at the end of the mental practice interval the rhythm disappeared and the cue that 
prompted participants to perform the rhythms appeared. As before, the rhythm itself was not 
presented again, requiring performance from memory. 
The trials in the actual experiment were identical to the third training session. There were 80 
trials altogether, separated by short breaks every 20 trials. All rhythms were shown once per 
block. There were equal numbers of trials in which the rhythms had to be played with the 
hands or the feet, and equal numbers for responding to the sounds with hands or feet. Trials 
were presented in a random order for each participant. 
Analysis. The analysis aimed to assess whether mentally practicing with a body part affected 
participants’ ability to use these body parts to respond to the sounds played in the mental 
practice interval. Error rates were calculated for each participant and condition by dividing 
the number of incorrect responses (participants using a wrong body part to respond to the 
beep) by the total number of trials. Trials were excluded if participants responded too early 
(i.e. before the imperative tone stimulus), or if the press of both response devices was not 
detected (4.8% in total). Mean response times (RTs) were calculated as the average RT of the 
left and right response keys, excluding trials for which the RT fell outside of three standard 
deviations of each participant’s mean RT with the respective body part (0.8%). 
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3.1.3 Results 
 
 
 Figure 3.2 Error rates (left panel) and Response times (right panel) in Experiment 1.  In each 
panel, the two left bars show the data for responses with the hand and the two right bars show 
responses with the feet. The black bars show responses while hand rhythms were mentally 
practiced and the white bars show responses while foot rhythms were practiced. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean. 
The data were analysed separately for Error Rates and RTs with repeated measures 2 x 2 
ANOVA, with the factors Response Effector (foot, hand) and Imagery Effector (foot, hand). 
The analysis of error rates revealed no main effect of Imagery Effector, F(1,15) = 0.93, p 
= .352, 2p = .06, but a significant main effect of Response Effector, F(1,15) = 7.07, p = .018, 
2p = .32, reflecting that participants made fewer errors when responding with the hand than 
with the foot. Importantly, the predicted interaction of Imagery Effector and Response 
Effector was significant, F(1,15) = 4.56, p = .045, 2p = .23, taking the form of an negative 
compatibility effect. Participants made more errors when responding with a body part already 
used for mental practice than when using a different body part. 
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The analysis of the RTs similarly revealed a significant main effect of Response Effector, 
F(1,15) = 172.89, p < .001, 2p = .92, with faster responses with the hand than with the foot. 
There was no significant main effect of Imagery Effector, F(1,15) = 0.85, p = .370, 2p = .05, 
and, in contrast to the error analysis, no interaction, F(1,15) = 0.452, p = .511, 2p = .03. 
Importantly, there was no evidence for a speed accuracy trade-off. Numerically, responses 
were slightly faster when different body parts were used for response and mental practice. 
Moreover, when correlating the size of the compatibility effects in RTs and error rates, only a 
(non-significant) positive correlation emerged (r = .10), suggesting that, if anything, those 
participants with negative compatibility effects in the error rates also tended to show negative 
effects in the RTs. 
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3.1.4 Discussion 
 
Experiment 1 investigated how mental practice of hand and foot actions affects the 
concurrent production of unrelated responses with feet or hands. The data revealed a negative 
compatibility effect: participants made more errors when responding with the same body 
parts as those used for mental practice, compared to using different body parts. In other 
words, foot responses were more accurate than hand responses when participants were 
mentally practicing a rhythm with the hand, while the reverse was true when mentally 
practicing a rhythm with the foot.  
This negative compatibility effect was found even though the rhythms were presented 
symbolically, and the task could in principle be equally solved by memorizing the sequence 
of button presses in an abstract, effector-independent manner. These data therefore provide 
the first behavioural evidence that mental practice of rhythms engages processes that are also 
involved in the execution of action. More specifically, the data suggest some form of resource 
competition, such that body parts involved in mental practice are less available for other, 
unrelated responses. This finding is consistent with the idea that mental practice engages 
action planning-related processes, which involve a binding of action features to motor plans, 
such that these responses are less available for other, unrelated actions (Hommel et al., 2001).  
One limitation of the present experiment is that the task required participants to mentally 
practice in order to memorize a sequence of movements. This situation does not conform to 
everyday mental practice, which typically involves the improvement of an already learned 
sequence of movements rather than its memorization from the ground up. Indeed, the 
requirement to memorize the rhythms might have interfered with typical mental practice 
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processes, giving rise to the negative compatibility effect. Experiment 2 was conducted to 
replicate the original findings in a simpler task, which does not require memorization.  
 
3.2.1 Experiment 2 – Development a New Task that does not require 
Memorization 
 
The procedure of Experiment 1 differed from typical mental practice in that, in Experiment 1, 
mental practice had be used to completely memorize the sequence of foot or hand button 
presses. This requirement ensured that participants mentally practiced the rhythms, as without 
mental practice, only random performance would have been possible (recall that the rhythms 
had to be re-produced without retrieval cues). However, typically, mental practice is used to 
merely improve performance of an already present motor skill. Ideally, the involvement of 
body part specific motor planning is demonstrated in a setting that captures this typical use of 
mental practice. The goal of Experiment 2 was to establish that our task can be used in such a 
setting. We therefore attempted to first test in a validation study, before again employing a 
compatibility paradigm, that our mental practice task leads to tangible performance 
improvements, when participants are later asked to reproduce the mentally practiced rhythms 
as quickly and accurately as possible (compared to a rhythm that was not practiced 
beforehand).  
As in Experiment 1, every trial began with a presentation of a complex rhythm that 
participants had to mentally practice with their hands or feet (while keeping completely still). 
In the second half of each trial, they were then given either the same or a different rhythm 
description, and they were required to produce this rhythm as quickly and accurately as 
possible. This task therefore removes the responses to the unrelated sounds, and provides a 
pure measure whether our task induces mental practice of the rhythm that is specific enough 
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to lead to performance improvements. If this is the case, then participants achieve better 
performance (i.e. faster and/or more accurate) for rhythms that had just been mentally 
practiced, compared to rhythms that have not. Prior research (e.g., Wohldmann, Healy & 
Bourne, 2008) has established in a similar task that required speeded typing of digit 
sequences that mental practice affects not only planning measures of performance (response 
initiation time), but also the execution itself (time to type the sequence). If our task captures 
the same mechanisms, similar effects on both initiation time and playing time are expected.  
 
3.2.2 Method 
 
Participants. Thirteen students (three male, age range: 18-25) took part in the experiment. 
They satisfied all requirements in volunteer screening and gave informed consent approved 
by the School of Psychology Ethics Committee at Plymouth University. Participants were 
paid either at a rate of £6/hour or they received course credits. All participants were in good 
health, had no history of disease or medical treatment that might influence visuomotor 
functions. As in the main experiments, participants were excluded when they produced 
invalid rhythms in the execution interval (rhythms 50% longer/shorter than the required 
rhythm length) in more than 20% of the trials. This was the case for two participants. 
Materials and apparatus. The experiment was controlled by the experimental control 
software Presentation (www.neurobs.com), running on a 2.0 GHz PC running Windows XP. 
Foot responses were recorded with two foot pedals (33 cm apart), which were attached to the 
floor with black tape, and connected to the computer via the parallel port. Hand response 
keys were the Ctrl-key (operated by participants’ left hand) and the Enter key on the number 
block (operated by the right hand).  
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Twenty different rhythms were created for the experiment. Ten of these rhythms were to be 
played with the left and right hands and ten rhythms (mirror images of the first 10 rhythms) 
were to be played with the left and right feet. All rhythms were presented in a symbolic 
format consisting of 16 lines, each line corresponding to the click of an imagined metronome. 
The taps that participants had to produce were represented by As on the left and Bs on the 
right side of each line (see Appendix B). As on the left side represented button presses or foot 
pedal presses on the left side, while Bs on the right side represented presses with the right 
foot or right key. A line containing both an A and a B designated taps with both feet or both 
hands. To the left and the right of each rhythm, a symbol depicting either a hand or a foot was 
shown, reminding participants of the body part with which this rhythm would have to be 
mentally practiced and subsequently played. 
Procedure and design. The participants were seated in a dimly lit room, facing a computer at 
a distance of approximately 60 cm. The experiment contained two training sessions that 
lasted about 10 minutes altogether, each consisting of eight trials. The experiment proper 
took about 36 minutes, resulting in a total experiment time of roughly 55 minutes. The 
participants were tested individually and instructed by the software and the experimenter.  
The first and second training sessions were identical to those of Experiment 1. The first 
training session introduced the participants to the (difficult) task of tapping the rhythms (see 
Appendix B for instructions). In each of the eight trials, participants were first presented with 
a cue telling them which effectors (hands or feet) they had to use to produce a rhythm. This 
cue remained on the screen for 2000 ms and read “Produce the following rhythm with the 
hands/feet!” After a short blank (300 ms), the rhythm was shown on the monitor (see Figure 
1, middle frame). Pictures to its left and right reminded participants of the body part to be 
used. Participants then produced this rhythm while it was on the screen (maximum 11200 ms). 
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The second training session introduced participants to the mental training component of the 
task (see Appendix B for instructions). In each trial, participants were again first presented 
(for 2000 ms) with a cue specifying the body parts (hands or feet) they should use to mentally 
train the following rhythm. After a short blank (300 ms), they were then shown one of the 20 
rhythms that they had to mentally practice for 10200 ms, while not making any overt 
movement. The rhythm description remained on the screen in this interval. After another 
blank (800 ms), a cue saying “Now produce the rhythm!” appeared, together with a 
description of either the same or a different rhythm than the one they had just practiced. 
Participants now played the rhythm as quickly and accurate as possible with the body part 
they had used for mental practice. They were reminded of this body part with small pictures 
appearing on the screen. They had 9200 ms. to tap the rhythm. 
The trials in the actual experiment were identical to the second training session. There were 
80 trials altogether, separated by short breaks every 20 trials. All rhythms were shown once 
per block. There were equal numbers of trials in which the rhythms had to be played with the 
hands or the feet. Trials were presented in a random order for each participant. 
Analysis. We assessed the influence of mental practice on how well participants played the 
rhythms afterwards, in terms of three variables. The first variable, initiation time, measured 
the time it took participants to initiate the tapping in the execution interval. For each 
participant and each trial, we subtracted the time of the first button press from the start of the 
execution interval. Initiation time therefore mostly measures impact on the planning 
processes that take place during rhythm execution (cf. Wohldman, et al., 2007; 2008). The 
second variable, play time, measured the speed with which participants produced the rhythms. 
For each rhythm played by a participant, we subtracted the time of the first button press in the 
execution interval from the last button press. Play time is typically seen to capture primarily 
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execution related processes (cf. Wohldman, et al., 2007; 2008). The third variable, deviance, 
measured the accuracy of participants’ performance. This was computed as the average of 
two sub-measures. First, we measured the difference between the number of beats that the 
participants produced and the number of beats that were required for this particular rhythm, 
as a percentage of the total rhythm length. Second, we assessed whether the participants’ 
relative frequency of presses with the left and right buttons corresponded to the relative 
frequency of left and right presses required by the rhythm, again as a percentage of total 
rhythm length. For these analyses, trials in which the button presses of the participants 
deviated by 50% or more from the required button presses were excluded, as well as trials in 
which participants took longer than 12 seconds to play the rhythm, or in which there was a 
pause between two button presses longer than 2 seconds. 
3.2.3 Results 
 
Participants’ performance on each of the three measures – initiation time, play time, and 
deviance – was compared with paired, two-sided t-tests between trained and untrained 
rhythms. This revealed significant improvements for trained rhythms with regard to initiation 
time, t = 4.99; p = .001, playing time, t = 2.95; p = .015, but not deviance, t < 1. The effect in 
play time and initiation time were negatively related (r = -.37, n.s.), suggesting that 
participants can compensate performance deficits with longer planning. Table 3.1 shows the 
performance for each measure.  
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Table 3.1 Initiation Time, Play Time, and Deviance for trained and untrained rhythms. 
 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 verified that our task induced mental practice that was effective and specific 
enough to affect subsequent rhythm performance. The same rhythms and the same 
instructions for maximizing performance were given (but without the need to respond to the 
sounds), and we measured if participants were better able to tap a rhythm they had previously 
trained, compared to a different rhythm. We found that both time to initiate the rhythm (time 
from presentation of the rhythm to the first finger press) and playing time (time from first to 
last finger press) decreased for trained relative to untrained rhythms. This study therefore 
confirms, first, that that the instruction to maximize performance is effective in inducing 
mental practice. Moreover, it shows that mental practice in our tasks does not only affect 
planning related measures, but also those related to motor execution, replicating prior 
findings (Wohldmann, et al., 2007; 2008). 
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3.3.1 Experiment 3 – Investigating Mental Practice with the New Task 
without Memorization. 
 
Experiment 2 has demonstrated that mental practice of the rhythms does lead to tangible 
performance improvements, even when a symbolic description of the rhythms is given also in 
the mental practice interval, such that participants did not have to reproduce the rhythms from 
memory but merely tried to execute them as fluently as possible. Experiment 3 tests if the 
same negative compatibility effects as in Experiment 1 are observed, when the memory 
component is removed from the task.   
Experiment therefore simplified the procedure by (a) replacing some of the more difficult 
rhythms with ones that were easier to tap, and (b) by showing participants the symbolic 
rhythm description also in the production interval, obviating the need for memorization, as it 
was the case in Experiment 2. To still encourage mental practice prior to execution, we used 
the same instruction as in Experiment 2. Participants were instructed that they were required 
to produce the rhythm as quickly and as accurately as possible in the execution interval, and 
that they should use the opportunity for mental practice interval to maximize their 
performance. Again, while participants practiced the rhythms, one of two sounds was played 
to them that they had to respond to with either their hands or their feet.  
The predictions were as before. If mental practice relies on the same mechanisms as actual 
action execution, then participants’ ability to respond with hand and feet should be 
determined by whether they are mentally practicing a movement with hands or feet. 
Moreover, a negative compatibility effect should be found if utilizing a body part for mental 
practice leads to resource competition, making this body part less available for unrelated 
responses. 
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3.3.2 Method 
 
Participants. Twenty–three volunteers (8 male, age range: 18-24) took part in the experiment. 
They were paid £8/hour for their participation. All other aspects of participant 
selection/exclusion were identical to Experiment 1. Five participants did not meet the 
inclusion criterion of fewer than 20% of trials with invalid responses/rhythms and were 
excluded from the analysis. 
Materials, apparatus and procedure. Materials and apparatus were identical to Experiment 1, 
with the following exceptions. First, the more difficult rhythms were exchanged with simpler 
rhythms. Second, participants now saw a symbolic description of the rhythm that they had to 
produce also in the production interval, not only during mental practice. Thus, they did not 
have to memorize the rhythm in the mental practice interval to be able to play it later. Third, 
to ensure that participants were still mentally practicing the rhythms even in this more relaxed 
setup, the instructions to participants now emphasized that the rhythms had to be performed 
as quickly and accurately as possible, and that they should use the mental practice intervals to 
achieve the best possible performance (see Appendix C for instructions). 
Analysis. 2.9% of trials were excluded because they contained “too early” responses or 
because the press of both response devices was not detected. For the analysis of RTs, error 
trials (2.1%) as well as trials with RTs that fell outside three standard deviations of the mean 
RT for responses with this body part (0.2%) were additionally excluded. 
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3.3.3 Results 
 
Responses to the sounds. As before, RTs and Error Rates were analysed with separate 2 x 2 
ANOVAs. The analysis of the error rates (Figure 3.3, left panel) revealed neither a main 
effect of Imagery Effector, F(1,17) = 1.35, p = .262, , 2p = .07, nor of Response Effector, 
F(1,17) = 2.19, p = .157, 2p = .11. However, as before, the interaction of Imagery Effector 
and Response Effector was significant, F(1,17) = 7.37, p = .015, 2p = .30. Replicating 
Experiment 1, this interaction took the form of a negative compatibility effect, with 
participants making more errors when responding with the body part used for mental practice 
compared to a different body part. 
The analysis of the RTs (Figure 3.3, right panel) revealed a main effect of Response Effector, 
F(1, 17) = 87.7, p < .001, 2p = .84, and an effect of Imagery Effector, F(1, 17) = 10.9, p 
= .004, 2p = .39. Participants responded more quickly when mentally practicing with the 
hand, and when responding with the hand. However, as before, the interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 17) = .71, p = .411, 2p = .04. The size of the compatibility effects in RTs 
and error rates were, if anything, positively correlated (r = .10, n.s.), providing no evidence of 
a speed accuracy trade-off. 
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Figure 3.3  Error rates (left panel) and Response times (right panel) in Experiment 3.  In each 
panel, the two left bars show the data for responses with the hand and the two right bars show 
responses with the feet. The black bars show responses while hand rhythms were mentally 
practiced and the white bars show responses while foot rhythms were practiced. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
 
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 1 in a simpler task that did not rely on 
memorization of the rhythms. Here, as in everyday usage, mental practice served the 
improvement of subsequent motor performance. Despite these changes to the experimental 
paradigm, the results of Experiment 1 were completely replicated. Participants again made 
more errors when responding to the sound with a body part that was already used for 
mentally practicing the rhythms. This replication of the negative compatibility effect of 
Experiment 1 therefore indicates that this negative compatibility effect is not due to the 
requirement to memorize the abstract rhythms. Rather, it appears to be a general consequence 
of mental practice, suggesting that a body part engaged in mental practice is less available for 
other, unrelated responses. 
47 
 
3.4.1 Experiment 4 – Do the Effects hold when Mental Practice and 
Execution are separated by another Task? 
 
One limitation of the previous experiments was that mental practice was immediately 
followed by the execution of the rhythms. This type of ‘pre-performance imagery’ (Morris, 
Spittle, & Watt, 2005) is often used in sports, before athletes engage in a difficult 
performance, and can be understood as an explicit and strategic form of movement 
preparation (e.g., Jeannerod, 1995, 1994; Lotze & Halsband, 2006). However, it raises the 
question whether the negative compatibility effect truly emerges from mental practice. An 
alternative is that the effect emerges because participants already anticipate using the body 
part for the motor actions – the tapping of the rhythm – they will be making in a few seconds. 
In other words, the negative compatibility effects might not arise from the usage of the body 
part in mental practice, but the anticipation of an imminent motor response with this body 
part. 
Experiment 4 therefore tests whether the same results will be found when mental practice and 
execution do not follow one another immediately. Participants did not produce the rhythms 
immediately after practicing them. Rather, they now mentally practiced two rhythms, one 
after the other, before they executed both of them (in the same order in which they practiced 
them). Thus, Experiment 4 separates the mental practice of a rhythm and its execution by a 
different task (either the mental practice of another rhythm, or the actual execution of another 
rhythm). If the same effects are found as before, this would show that the effects do not 
reflect the anticipation of an imminent motor response with this body part, but are related to 
mental practice. In addition, it would extend our data to another type of mental practice that 
involves a larger interval between practice and execution in which various other behaviours 
take place. 
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3.4.2 Method 
 
Participants. Twenty-two volunteers (9 male, age range: 19- 40) took part in the experiment. 
All other aspects of the participant selection were identical to Experiment 1 and 2. Five 
participants did not meet the inclusion criterion of fewer than 20% of trials with invalid 
responses/rhythms. 
Materials and apparatus. Materials and apparatus were identical to Experiment 2. 
Procedure and Design. Experiment 3 differed to the previous experiment in that only 40 
(instead of 80) experimental trials were presented. However, these trials now consisted of 
four (instead of 2) phases: mental training of the first rhythm, mental training of the second 
rhythm, execution of the first rhythm, and execution of the second rhythm. Both rhythms had 
to be executed with the same body part (see Appendix D for instructions). The timing and 
presentation order in the different phases corresponded to the mental practice and execution 
phases of the previous experiments. Again, a low or high sound was played 5000, 5500, 6000 
or 6500 ms after the start of either the first or the second mental practice interval and 
participants responded to these sounds by either pressing both feet or both hand response 
keys. In the two execution intervals, participants again saw the description of the two rhythms 
and produced them as quickly as possible (both rhythms with the same body parts). 
Analysis. 5.1% of trials were excluded because they contained “too early” responses or 
because the press of both response devices was not detected. For the analysis of RTs, error 
trials (2.1%) as well as trials with RTs that fell outside three standard deviations of the mean 
RT for responses with this body part (1.2%) were additionally excluded. 
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3.4.3 Results 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Error rates (left panel) and Response times (right panel) in Experiment 4.  In each panel, 
the two left bars show the responses during mental practice of the first rhythm, and the bars on the 
right show responses during mental practice of the second rhythm. The black bars show responses 
with the same body part that is used for mental practice while the white bars show responses with the 
different body part. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
The data were analysed with repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the factors Response 
Effector (foot, hand), Imagery Effector (foot, hand), and Rhythm (first rhythm, second 
rhythm). The analysis of error rates (Figure 3.4, left panel) revealed neither a main effect of 
Imagery Effector, F(1, 16) = 1.75, p = .204, 2p = .10, Response Effector, F(1, 16) = .80, p 
= .38, 2p = .05, or Rhythm, F(1, 16) = 3.77, p = .07, 
2
p = .19. However, as before, there was 
a significant interaction of Imagery Effector and Response Effector, F(1, 16) = 7.61, p 
= .014, , 2p = .32, again taking the form of a negative compatibility effect. No other effect 
was significant (all F < 1). Most importantly, there was no evidence for a three way 
interaction of Response Effector, Imagery Effector and Rhythm, F(1, 19) = 0.003. Indeed, 
planned comparisons confirmed that the interaction of Response Effector and Rhythm was 
present for both the mental practice of both the first F(1,16) = 3.71, p = .072, 2p = .19, and 
the second rhythm, F(1,16) = 6.97, p = .018, 2p = .30. 
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Again, the analysis of RTs (Figure 3.4, right panel) only revealed a main effect of Response 
Effector, F(1, 17) = 19.4, p < .001, 2p = .55, and of Rhythm, F(1, 17) = 14.0, p = .002, 
2
p 
= .47. No other main effect or interaction was significant (all F < 1.5). In particular, as in the 
previous experiments, the analysis of the RTs did not reveal an interaction of Imagery 
Effector and Response Effector, F(1,17) = 0.49, p = .494, 2p = .03. Moreover, the size of the 
compatibility effects in RTs and Error Rates were positively correlated (r = .29, n.s.), ruling 
out speed accuracy trade-offs. 
3.4.4 Discussion 
 
The data again showed that participants made fewer errors when the body parts used for 
responding to the sounds and for mentally practicing the rhythms were different rather than 
the same. This suggests that the inhibitory effects do not only emerge because participants 
plan to use this body part for an imminent motor response. Rather, it reveals a specific effect 
of utilizing a body part in mental practice, such that it is less available for other responses.  
3.4.5 Experiment 1 to 4 – Summary and Conclusions 
 
Experiments 1 to 4 developed a first behavioural test of whether mental practice of motor 
skills relies on body-part specific mechanisms guiding physical action execution. Participants 
made responses with their hands or feet while mentally practicing complex rhythms with 
either the same or different body parts. In three experiments, we found a direct influence of 
mental practice on these unrelated responses, which took the form of a negative compatibility 
effect. Thus, while mentally practicing a rhythm with the hand participants were more likely 
to accidentally respond with the foot. Conversely, mentally practicing with the foot increased 
the likelihood of participants accidentally responding with the hand.  
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This effect of mental practice on the execution of unrelated responses was robust and 
generalizable. It was found when participants practiced the rhythms to improve their 
performance (Experiments 2), and when they practiced to perform them later from memory 
(Experiment 1). Importantly, it was also found when mental practice and execution of the 
rhythms was interrupted by an intervening task (Experiment 3), suggesting that the effect 
does not simply reflect the anticipation of an imminent response with a body part.  
This is the first behavioural study to reveal such a direct link between mental practice and 
overt motor behavior. On a general level, our study therefore supports theories that assume 
that mental practice is, at least, partially enactive and relies on processes also involved in 
action planning and execution (e.g., Jeannerod, 2005). Remarkably, of course, our effect was 
a negative compatibility effect, such that body parts used for mental practice were less rather 
than more available for the unrelated responses. This finding contrasts starkly with previous 
studies on stimulus-response compatibility. Across a variety of stimuli and experimental 
paradigms, positive compatibility effects are typically found: responses are faster and more 
accurate when they share features with a stimulus (e.g., for reviews, see Hommel, 2001; 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). 
We propose that the negative compatibility effects emerge here because mental practice is not 
akin to the incidental observation (or imagination of stimuli), but rather involves purposeful 
acts of action planning where the foot and hand rhythms were integrated into concrete action 
plans that could guide eventual execution. Indeed, prior research has tied the negative 
compatibility effects directly to the formation of action plans: they are obtained whenever a 
task creates an overlap between a response and a simultaneously planned – but not yet 
executed – action (Hommel et al., 2001; Thomaschke et al. 2012). They indicate that the 
overlapping action features are already “bound” to this plan, and are less available for 
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competing plans. It has been found, for example, that planning a left or right response makes 
it harder to make concurrent responses in the same direction, and even to identify stimuli 
pointing in the same direction (Stoet & Hommel, 1997; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001; for similar 
effects, see Hübner & Druey, 2006; Schuch & Koch, 2004, 2010). Our data therefore 
indicates that mental practice may specifically capture these planning stages of action, where 
desired features are integrated into an action plan, until it is aligned with both the goal of the 
individual and the demands of the performance situation, and can effectively drive motor 
execution.  
An interesting finding was that our compatibility effects were only found in errors, not RTs, 
therefore reflecting the selection of an inappropriate effector for responding to the sounds 
(e.g., feet instead of hands). Effects only in errors – or only in RTs, for that matter – are 
typically seen as the ends of a continuum, where task factors bias participants towards either 
an optimization of response times or accuracy. In our study, various unspecific factors may 
have contributed to such a bias: (1) participants did not receive feedback for either errors or 
too-slow responses, such that errors went unnoticed in many cases, and participants were not 
forced to make faster responses. (2) Even though participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible to the sounds, the mental practice task was described as the 
primary task; subjects were instructed to not let this task be disrupted by the unrelated 
responses. (3) Due to the high demands of the primary task, response times to the sounds 
are unusually slow and reflect the average of two bi-manual or bi-pedal responses, further 
obscuring any RT effects.  
In addition to these unspecific task factors, however, the effect in errors/effector selection 
could also be taken as further evidence for a planning-origin of our effects. Effector selection 
is one of the earliest stages of motor planning, and changes in effector-specific readiness 
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potentials are seen long before movements are initiated, and before other planning stages take 
part (see Bernier, Cieslak & Grafton, 2012 for recent evidence). Effector selection rates have 
been a measure of choice in recent action planning/binding experiments (e.g. Dutzi & 
Hommel, 2009). For our study, although post-hoc, the effect in error rates could therefore be 
taken as further indication that the overlap between physical action and mental practice 
happens on the level of action planning rather than physical action execution. 
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Chapter 4  
 
 
 
 
Action Observation and Mental Practice 
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4.1.1 The Relationship between Mental Practice and Observation Learning 
 
Experiment 1 to 4 provided robust evidence of negative compatibility effects of mental 
practice such that the body parts used for mentally practicing a rhythm are not as available for 
the execution of a different action as different body parts. The aim of Experiment 5 and 6 is 
to compare the motor activation during mental practice to motor activation during 
observation learning. As noted, a large body of research suggests that the observation of 
action goes along with a similar subliminal motor activation as motor imagery, and that this 
motor activation might be the foundation for the later imitation of the observed actions (for a 
review, see Iacoboni, 2009). An important question is therefore if both – mental practice and 
imitation learning – are based on the same underlying mechanisms. The demonstration of 
such a similarity would provide a means of conceptualizing learning from observing others 
(i.e. imitation) in the same way as the mental practice of action. Experiment 5 therefore 
adapts the previous paradigm to the situation of observation learning, that is, a situation in 
which we watch another person perform the rhythms and try to learn from their performance, 
such that we are able to execute the rhythms more effectively afterwards. 
Such a change also allows us to test why the results obtained in our mental practice tasks are 
so different to the typical findings from action observation experiments that report facilitatory 
effects of seeing and performing a similar action. For example, in recent experiments, it was 
found that observing hand and foot responses facilitated responses with the same body parts 
(Bach et al., 2007; Bach & Tipper, 2007), even when observed and executed motor 
movements were not identical, merely relying on the same body part (Gillmeister et al., 
2008).  
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There are two potential reasons for these differences. First, whereas in these prior studies the 
actions were directly presented, in ours they were imagined, based on a symbolic rhythm 
description. It could therefore be that the negative compatibility effects emerge from the 
requirement to imagine. Second, in the previous studies, the actions the participants observed 
were completely task irrelevant, while in the present experiment the imagined actions had to 
be later executed and were therefore the basis of the participants’ own responses. As noted 
above, various theorists (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Schuch & Koch, 2004; Stoet & Hommel, 
1997) have proposed that action codes that are part of one’s own action plans are not 
available for other processing (leading to negative compatibility effects), in contrast to the 
case when the same action codes are part of an incidentally observed stimulus (leading to 
positive compatibility effects).  
Experiment 5 and 6 therefore extends our paradigm to observation and tests these two 
competing accounts of the negative compatibility effects. 
4.1.2 Experiment 5 – Extending the Paradigm to Observation Learning  
 
Experiment 5 converted the mental practice paradigm used in Experiments 1 to 4 into an 
imitation paradigm. In the mental practice interval, participants now did not see a symbolic 
description of the rhythm, but watched a rhythm that was tapped by another person. As 
before, they had to mentally practice this rhythm in order to perform it as quickly and 
accurately as possible later, while they responded with hands or feet to two sounds played to 
them. The difference to Experiments 1 to 4 is that participants did not have to generate an 
imagined rhythm, but could just observe the other person’s movements, similar to prior work 
on action observation.  
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If, in Experiment 1 to 4, the negative compatibility effects emerge because the eliciting 
stimuli were only imagined, then these effects should not be observed here and may even turn 
into positive effects, because the actions are explicitly presented as in other studies on action 
observation and stimulus response compatibility. If, however, the negative compatibility 
effects emerge because the body parts are part of an action plan, the same negative 
compatibility effects should be observed, because the same action plans have to be generated 
as in the previous experiments. 
 
4.1.3 Method  
 
Participants. Thirty-four students (9 male, age range 18-27) took part in the experiment. All 
other aspects of the participant selection were identical to the previous experiments. Seven 
participants were excluded as they produced more than 20% invalid responses/rhythms. 
Materials and apparatus. The apparatus was identical to the previous experiments. In 
addition to the symbolical rhythm descriptions, videos of another person tapping the rhythms 
were shot. The rhythms played by the person were the same as the rhythms used in the 
symbolic rhythm descriptions in Experiment 2. Thus there were 20 videos of a person tapping 
the rhythms with the foot and 20 videos of a person tapping the rhythms with the hand. All 
movies were 9 seconds long. They showed the frontal view of the actor, cropped such that 
either only his hands and arms or feet were visible (see Appendix E).  
Procedure and design. The procedure was based on Experiment 3. The course of each trial 
was identical to this experiment, with the exception that the symbolic rhythm descriptions in 
the mental practice interval were replaced with the movie stimuli of the same rhythms (see 
Figure 4.1, middle panel). Participants were instructed to watch these videos and use them to 
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prepare the rhythms. In the execution interval, the symbolic rhythm descriptions were shown 
as in Experiment 2, to obviate the need to memorize the observed rhythms. 
 
Figure 4.1   Illustration of the trial sequence in Experiment 5. The trial instruction (left panel) 
informed participants about the body part that would be used in the following rhythm. They then 
watched and mentally trained the demonstrated rhythm (middle panel) and responded with hands or 
feet to sounds played after 5000, 5500, 6000, or 6500 ms after the start of this interval. In the 
execution interval (right panel) they executed the rhythm. 
Analysis. 1.4% of trials were excluded because they contained “too early” responses or 
because the press of both response devices was not detected. For the analysis of RTs, error 
trials (2.8%) as well as trials with RTs that fell outside three standard deviations of the mean 
RT for responses with this body part (0.5%) were additionally excluded. 
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4.1.4 Results  
 
 
Figure4.2 Error rates (left panel) and Response times (right panel) in Experiment 5. In each panel, the 
two left bars show the data for responses with the hand and the two right bars show responses with the 
feet. The black bars show responses while hand rhythms were mentally practiced and the white bars 
show responses while foot rhythms were practiced. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
Figure 4.2 shows the results of the experiment. RTs and Error Rates were analysed with 
separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs with the repeated measures factors Imagery Effector (foot, hand) and 
Response Effector (foot, hand). The analysis of error rates revealed main effects of Imagery 
Effector, F(1,26) = 7.50, p = .011, 2p = .22, and of Response Effector, F(1,26) = 29.57, p 
< .001, 2p = .53, indicating that participants made fewer errors when responding with the 
hand than when responding with the foot, and when mentally practicing with the hand than 
the foot. Importantly, the interaction of Imagery Effector and Response Effector, F(1,26) = 
11.39, p = .002, 2p = .31, again revealed a negative compatibility effect.                                                                                                                
The analysis of RTs only revealed a main effect of Response Effector, F(1,26) = 349.69, p 
< .001, 2p = .93. The main effect of Imagery Effector and the interaction were not significant 
(F = 1.16 and F < 1, respectively). The size of the compatibility effects in response times and 
error rates were slightly negatively correlated (r = -.13, n.s.).  
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4.1.5 Discussion 
 
While previous work has focussed on automatic imitation, this is the first study to investigate 
the motoric consequences of observing somebody with the purpose of later imitating their 
actions. The data revealed a continuity between learning from symbolic rhythm descriptions 
in Experiments 1 to 4 and learning from somebody else’s actions in the present experiment. 
As in the earlier experiments, participants made fewer errors when using a body part that was 
not already engaged in mental practice, compared to a body part that was. This finding 
suggests that this effect is not due to the body part movements being merely imagined, rather 
than directly observed. What unifies all four experiments is that participants have to use the 
presented stimuli – be it videos or symbolic rhythm descriptions – to formulate a motor plan 
for later execution. Our finding is therefore consistent with the idea that generation of such a 
motor plan involves a binding of motor codes to action goals such that these codes are less 
available for other, unrelated responses (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001). 
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4.2.1 Experiment 6 – Does Eliminating the Need for Mental Practice Also 
Eliminate the Negative Compatibility Effect? 
 
Experiment 1 to 5 revealed that mental practice of rhythms induces negative compatibility 
effects, such that participants made more errors when responding with the body part already 
engaged during mental practice. An important question is whether these effects are really due 
to the mental practice induced by our task, or due to unspecific task or stimuli aspects. One 
possibility is, for example, that the effects are brought about the visual presentation of hands 
or feet in the mental practice interval, when the model used these body parts to tap the rhythm 
(Experiment 4), or when they served as reminder stimulus of which body part to train the 
rhythm with (in Experiments 1 to 3).  
Of course, even though the presentation of hands and feet by itself is known to elicit 
compatibility effects, these effects are usually positive, such that participants are more likely 
to respond with the presented body part, and not negative as was found here (Bach et al. 
2006; Gillmeister, et al. 2008). Moreover, these effects are typically found directly after 
stimulus onset but not after prolonged exposure to the stimuli within a trial (such as the 5 to 6 
seconds to the onset of the sounds as used here). Nevertheless, experiment 6 was designed to 
fully control for the possibility that the negative compatibility effects could be due to these or 
other unrelated task aspects.  
Participants were exposed to exactly the same stimuli as in Experiment 5 (observation 
learning), but now were not instructed to mentally practice the viewed rhythms. Rather, their 
task was to merely memorize the rhythm tapped by the other person, so that they would be 
able to decide, in the second phase of each trial, whether the rhythm was the same or different 
to a symbolic rhythm description. Thus, rather than requiring the transformation of somebody 
else’s action into one’s own action plan, this task requires a transformation of somebody 
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else’s action into a symbolic description. As such, Experiment 6 keeps visual stimulation and 
the attention to these stimuli constant, but eliminates the mental practice components of the 
task. If the negative compatibility effects found in Experiment 1 to 5 are due to mental 
practice, they should therefore be eliminated in the current experiment. If, however, the 
negative compatibility effects are brought about by unrelated task aspects (e.g., the presence 
of hands and feet in the stimuli) then the same effects should be observed here. 
4.2.2 Method 
 
Participants. 34 students (7 male, age range 18-24) took part in the experiment. As before, 
participants were excluded when no valid button presses were recorded in more than 20% of 
trials. Participants were also excluded when their performance in the same/difference task 
was indistinguishable from chance (<60% correct), or too few valid verbal responses were 
recorded (<80%). Of the 34 participants tested, this was the case for seven participants.  
Materials and apparatus. The material and apparatus was identical to Experiment 4, with the 
exception that a microphone was additionally used to record the participants’ verbal 
responses via Presentation’s (www.neurobs.com) sound threshold detection logic.  
Procedure and design. The procedure was based on Experiment 5. A movie of another person 
tapping a rhythm was presented in the first phase of each trial. Participants were instructed to 
watch this movie and to memorize the rhythm so that they would recognize it later. 
Participants again pressed either both foot or both hand buttons when they heard one of the 
two tones in this first “memorization” phase of the trials. In the second phase, participants 
were then shown a symbolic rhythm description (as used in the previous experiments) of 
either the same or a different rhythm. Their task was to merely state verbally whether this 
symbolic rhythm stimulus was “same” or “different” to the rhythm video they had just 
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observed (see Appendix F for instructions). The timing of these two phases across each trial 
was the same as in Experiment 4. However, as participants required less time to make their 
verbal same/different judgments than tapping the rhythm, we increased the number of trials 
(from 80 to 120), so that overall experiment times were similar. The results below are 
reported for the full 120 trials, but they are statistically identical when only the first 80 trials 
are analysed.  
Analysis. As before, the analysis focussed on the responses to the task-unrelated sounds. 2.6% 
of trials were excluded because they contained “too early” responses or because the press of 
both response devices was not detected. For the analysis of RTs, error trials (2.3%) as well as 
trials with RTs that fell outside three standard deviations of the mean RT for responses with 
this body part (1.1%) were additionally excluded. 
4.2.3 Results 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the results of the experiment. As before, RTs and Error Rates were analysed 
with separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs with the repeated measures factors Imagery Effector (foot, 
hand) and Response Effector (foot, hand). The analysis of error rates revealed main effects of 
Response Effector, F(1,26) = 16.46, p < .001, 2p = .39, indicating that participants made 
fewer errors when responding with the hand than when responding with the foot. However, 
there was no effect of Response Effector, F(1,26) = 0.17, p = .686, 2p < .01. Moreover, in 
contrast to all previous experiments, the interaction of Imagery Effector and Response 
Effector was not significant, F(1,26) = 0.043, p = .837, 2p < .01. Moreover, comparing the 
size of compatibility effects between Experiment 5 and 6, which were identical with regard to 
visual stimulation, revealed a marginally significant difference, t = 1.78; p = .081. The 
analysis of RTs only revealed a main effect of Response Effector, F(1,26) = 96.60, p < .001, 
64 
 
2p = .79. The main effect of Imagery Effector and the interaction were not significant (F < 1, 
for both).  
 
Figure 4.3 Error rates (left panel) and Response times (right panel) in Experiment 6. In each panel, 
the two left bars show the data for responses with the hand and the two right bars show responses with 
the feet. The black bars show responses while hand rhythms were mentally practiced and the white 
bars show responses while foot rhythms were practiced. Error bars show the standard error of the 
mean. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 6 shows that the previously recorded negative compatibility effects are, most 
likely, due to the requirement to mentally practice the presented rhythms, and not just due to 
unrelated stimulus or task aspects (such as the presence of hands and feet in the visual 
stimulation). All these general task demands were kept identical in Experiment 5, while the 
need for mental practice was removed. We found that this also led to a complete absence of 
negative compatibility effects, suggesting that the negative compatibility effects are due to 
mental practice rather than these unrelated task aspects. 
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4.2.5 Experiment 5 and 6 – Summary and Conclusions 
 
While Experiments 1 to 4 links action planning to mental practice, Experiments 5 and 6 
extend this link to imitation. Imitation is a key means for transmitting knowledge, both within 
and between generations. It allows observers to put themselves into the other persons’ shoes, 
vicariously experience the outcome of their actions and learn from their experience, enabling 
them to later reproduce their behaviours and achieve the same goals. It is often assumed that 
humans can imitate because watching others act does give rise to activity in motor areas of 
the brain, which in turn evokes a tendency for humans to automatically (non-strategically and 
non-consciously) copy their behaviour and body postures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; for 
reviews, see Heyes, 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2012; van der Wel, et al., 2013). It is assumed 
that, for imitation proper, observers could simply “tap into” this motor activation to 
reproduce the desired behaviours. 
Experiment 5 challenges these ideas by revealing that the general motor resonance evoked by 
incidentally observing others is absent when people watch others with the express purpose to 
imitate them later. Instead, the to-be-imitated action features were less – rather than more – 
available for unrelated responses. Experiment 5 therefore suggests that watching somebody to 
imitate is more akin to mental practice than automatic imitation and gives rise to the same 
binding effects. Both cases may therefore involve the purposeful selection of intended action 
features and “binding” them into an action plan. The only difference is that in mental practice 
these features were self-generated, while in imitation they could be extracted directly from 
the other person’s action. 
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Chapter 5  
 
 
 
 
Additional Analyses of Experiment 1 to 6 
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5.1 Additional Analyses of Experiment 1 to 6 
 
Experiments 1 to 6 revealed robust evidence that mental practice and observation learning 
draws upon body part specific processes involved in physical action execution, particularly 
pointing to planning related processes that bind features to intended action plans. Here we 
report additional analyses that further support the conclusions drawn, that provide insights 
into aspects of the data that were not in the focus of the main experiment, and that allow us to 
test hypotheses that require power supplied by across-experiment analyses. 
 
5.2 Analysis 1 – Do Spontaneous Motor Responses Reflect the 
Establishment of an Action Plan? 
 
We observed that participants sometimes produced overt motor responses before the 
imperative sound cues were played. These “too early” trials were excluded from the main 
analysis, but can be seen as a potential further indicator of the engagement of body-part 
specific motor systems when mentally practicing the rhythms. To test whether these 
responses indeed reflect the spontaneous outflow of body-part specific motor activation, we 
tested whether these responses were more likely to be made with the body part with which 
the rhythm had to be mentally practiced. As only few participants made these responses in 
each experiment (see Table 1), the comparison was run across all participants that produced 
“too early” responses across all experiments in order to increase power. As expected, across 
experiments, participants were more likely to make “too early” responses with the body part 
used for mental practice compared with the other body part, t(25) = 1.86, p = .037. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the pattern held numerically for each of the four experiments, and was 
marginally significant for Experiment 3 and 4 when tested separately. The data from the “too 
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early” responses therefore support the notion that mental practice relies on a covert motoric 
simulation of the rhythms, which can sometimes accidentally drive overt motor behavior. 
 
Tables 5.1 Spontaneous Motor Response in Mental Practice Interval across Experiment. 
 
5.3 Analysis 2 – Does the Negative Compatibility Effects Reflect Response 
Inhibition or Action Effect Binding? 
 
An important question is what process the negative compatibility effects reflect. We 
interpreted these effects in terms of resource competition. Accordingly, action planning 
requires the binding of action features to an action plan or goal (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001). 
Action features that are bound in this way are less available to be incorporated into another, 
unrelated action that subserves a different goal. In our case, body parts used to mentally 
practice a rhythm may therefore be bound to the plan to produce this rhythm, and are 
therefore less available to respond to the unrelated sounds. However, an alternative view is 
that the negative compatibility effects reflect inhibitory processes that prevent the formulated 
motor plans from activating overt motor responses, until required by the task. Indeed, if 
motor imagery is equivalent to actual motor output then there need to be processes that 
inhibit the spontaneous outflow of motor activity during mental practice (e.g., James, 1890; 
Vogt, 1996), and a recent fMRI study has provided evidence for such inhibition (Solodkin et 
al., 2004).  
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One way to distinguish between these possibilities is to relate the negative compatibility 
effects to the spontaneous motor outflow during the mental practice interval (the “too early” 
responses analysed above). The resource competition and motor inhibition accounts make 
different predictions of how these spontaneous motor outputs should be related to the 
negative compatibility effects. According to the motor inhibition view, those participants that 
show the strongest negative compatibility effects when responding to the sounds should be 
the least likely to produce an overt motor response in the mental practice interval. The reason 
is that if the negative compatibility effects reflect an inhibition of spontaneous motor 
responses, then those participants that inhibit more should produce less motor output. The 
reverse is the case for the resource competition view. On this view, those participants with the 
strongest negative compatibility effects are seen as the participants that have formulated the 
strongest motor plans in the mental practice interval. They should therefore be the most likely 
to mistakenly execute this action plan, and show “too early” responses with the body part 
used for mental practice. 
The results favour the resource competition view. We computed the correlation between each 
participant’s negative compatibility effect with their tendency to produce a motor response 
before the sounds were played with the body part used for mental practice (as opposed to 
responses with the opposite body part not engaged in mental practice). As before, to increase 
power, this correlation was computed across all 26 participants in Experiment 1 to 4, who 
produced button presses before the sounds were played (after standardizing the effects for 
each experiment). Indeed, a highly significant negative correlation emerged (r = -.63, p 
< .001), indicating that those participants with the strongest negative compatibility effects 
were more – rather than less – likely to make an anticipative motor response with the body 
part used for mental practice. Negative correlations were also observed when each 
experiment was analysed separately (Exp. 1 (memory), r = -.91, Exp. 3 (fast responses), r = -
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.47, Exp. 4 (delayed responses), r = -.30, Exp. 5 (imitation), r = -.86). This correlational 
analysis therefore supports the view that the negative compatibility effects do not reflect the 
attempt to inhibit spontaneous motor outflow, but the formulation of an action plan that 
requires the “binding” of an effector to the action plan so that it is less available for other, 
unrelated responses. 
 
5.4 Analysis 3 – Does Responding with the Same or Different Body Part 
Affect the Ability to Mentally Practice the Rhythms? 
 
The effects described so far reflect the effect of mental practice on the concurrent execution 
of unrelated responses. However, to the extent that mental practice and overt responses rely 
on the same underlying motor representations, then the opposite influence might be present as 
well: the hand and foot responses participants make to the sounds could affect how well they 
are able to mentally practice the foot and hand rhythms. In other words, mental practice of the 
rhythms might be easier or harder depending on whether it was interrupted by a response 
made with the same or with a different body part. Although not the primary focus of this 
investigation, such reverse effects of action on cognition have been demonstrated before (e.g., 
Tipper & Bach, 2008; Bach & Tipper, 2007; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Symes et al., 2008, 
2009, 2010; Topolinski, 2012). They are often less robust and less often investigated than the 
typical compatibility effects of a stimulus on a response, but are typically seen as providing 
evidence that the engagement of the motor representations reflects a use of these 
representations in the interrupted task, rather than mere epiphenomenal activations (Hommel 
et al., 2002).  
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To assess the influence of overt responses on the ability to mentally practice the rhythms, we 
assessed how well participants played the rhythms afterwards. Two variables were created to 
assess the participants’ performance. The first variable, play time, measured the speed with 
which participants produced the rhythms. For each rhythm played by a participant, we 
subtracted the time of the first button press in the execution interval from the last button press. 
The second variable, deviance, measured the accuracy of participants’ performance. This was 
computed as the average of two sub-measures. First, we measured the absolute difference 
between the number of beats that the participants produced and the number of beats that were 
required for this particular rhythm, as a percentage of the total rhythm length. Second, we 
assessed whether the participants’ relative frequency of presses with the left and right buttons 
corresponded to the relative frequency of left and right presses required by the rhythm, again 
as a percentage of total rhythm length. For these analyses, trials in which the button presses 
of the participants deviated by 50% or more from the required button presses were excluded, 
as well as trials in which participants took longer than 12 seconds to play the rhythm, or in 
which there was a pause between two button presses longer than 2 seconds. 
 
  
Tables 5.2 Deviance and play time depending on whether mental practice was interrupted by a 
response with same or a different body part used in mental practice.   
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Computing the performance of participants on these two measures revealed a consistent 
numerical pattern across experiments for the deviance measure. As can be seen in Table 5.2, 
in all four experiments, participants tapped the rhythms more accurately when they had 
utilized the same body parts for responding to the sounds and for mental practice, compared 
to trials in which they used a different body part. This difference was highly significant when 
data was pooled across experiments to increase power (t(77) = 2.66, p = .009). When 
performance was compared for each experiment separately, a significant difference was 
apparent for Experiment 3, t(17) = 2.67, p = .016, and a marginally significant difference for 
Experiment 5, t(26) = 1.61, p = .059, but not for Experiment 1, t(15) = 1.41, p = .150, and 
Experiment 4, t(16) = 0.71, p = .487). 
As can be seen in Table 2, the play time measure did not reveal a consistent pattern across 
experiments. There was no significant difference, either when performance in both conditions 
was compared across experiments to increase power (t(77) = 0.68, p = .500), or in any of the 
single experiments (Experiment 1, t(15) = 0.056, p = .956; Experiment 3, t(17) = 0.00, p 
= .998; Experiment 3, t(26) = 1.34, p = .20; Experiment 5, t(26) = .01, p = .994).  
Thus, the analysis of the rhythm performance reveals a consistent positive compatibility 
effect, at least when the data are pooled across experiments. Participants tapped the rhythms 
more accurately when their prior mental practice was interrupted by a button press that 
corresponded to the body part used in their motor plan, compared to a different body part.  
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5.5 Post- hoc Analysis 4 – Does the Data Pattern hold Across Response 
Modalities? 
 
The effects in Experiments 1 to 5 were driven more strongly by the trials requiring a foot 
response compared to hand responses. Indeed, while the difference for foot response was 
significant for most experiments (see Table 5.3), too few errors were generally made for hand 
responses to demonstrate similar statistical differences. It is therefore crucial to demonstrate 
that our effects are not just an unspecific effect on foot responses, but a general tendency to 
respond with the effector not used in mental practice, irrespective of whether a hand or foot 
response is required. First, the consistency of results across experiments supports the 
presence of such a crossover interaction. In all experiments, error rates were reduced for foot 
as well hand responses when a different effector was used for mental practice. Second, and 
more importantly, this consistency was also be supported statistically, when the data was 
pooled (and standardized) across Experiments 1 to 5 to increase power. Pairwise tests, run 
separately for trials requiring hand responses and foot responses, revealed significant 
reductions of error rates when different body parts were used for mental practice and 
responding to the sounds for both foot responses (t = 4.82; p < .001) and hand responses (t = 
2.37; p = .020). This verified that the negative compatibility effects indeed affect both 
response modalities: for both feet and hand responses, participants are more likely to utilize a 
different body part, when the required body part is already in use for mentally practicing the 
rhythms.     
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Tables 5.3 Significance tests for compatibility effects across Experiment 1 to 5.and data is 
pooled across experiments, separately for trials requiring foot or hand responses. 
 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The data from Experiments 1 to 6 suggest that mental practice is based on planning-related 
motor processes. These processes allow actors to establish concrete plans for motor execution, 
by “binding” the different features an action needs to be successful – speed, direction of 
motion, or, here, the sequence of button presses with a certain body part – into unified plans 
for action. During mental practice, these planning processes may allow actors to develop 
complex plans for action that are aligned with both their goals and the (anticipated) demands 
of the performance situation.  
The additional analysis reported here supported such an involvement of planning related 
processes in mental practice. One feature of planning accounts is that the integration of 
features into action plans, while preventing their use for other responses, will benefit the 
execution of current plans. Such an effect was revealed by the analysis of the spontaneous 
motor responses participants sometimes made during mental practice. We found that those 
participants with the strongest negative compatibility effects were the most likely to 
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accidentally press a response key during mental practice. Importantly, these responses were 
made with the body part concurrently used for mental practice, consistent with the idea that 
they reflect action plans that participants “forgot” to inhibit. Although post-hoc, these data 
therefore confirm that mental practice indeed has two coupled effects on overt motor 
behavior: it prevents the use of the relevant action features in unrelated responses, and, at the 
same time, facilitates the execution of the current plan (cf. Hommel et al., 2001).  
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Chapter 6  
 
 
 
 
    Transfer of Learning and Mental practice 
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6.1.1 Exploring Effector  Specificity of Mental Practice with a Transfer of 
Learning Task 
 
Experiments 1 to 6 provided robust evidence that mental practice and observation learning 
draw upon body part specific processes involved in physical action execution, particularly 
pointing to planning-related processes that integrate intended action features – in our case, the 
sequence of left and right button presses to be executed with a specific body part – to 
potential action plans.  
A key feature of such planning accounts is that planning can occur across multiple levels, 
some more proximally and some more distally related to the actual body movements (cf. 
Hommel, et al., 2001). For example, the simple act of turning on the light might be planned 
on the level of low-level motor consequences one wants to achieve – extending one’s arms 
towards the light switch and pressing it – but also on the level of more distal action 
consequences: the faint clicking sound that accompanies a successful press of the switch, and 
the turning on of the light (cf. Hommel, et al., 2001). Depending on expertise, goals and task 
requirement, people can switch between these distal and proximal modes of action planning, 
with a general preference given to more high-level, goal oriented planning (Wulf, 2007). 
The data of Experiments 1 to 6, however, suggests that the action plans established during 
mental practice are relatively low level and concrete. They involved body part specific motor 
processes, even in cases where such an involvement was not explicitly required, and the task 
could simply be accomplished by learning a sequence of left and right button presses. There 
are two potential reasons for such an effect. First, during mental practice and action planning, 
it may be mandatory to specify the involvement of body parts, even if participants do not 
explicitly take them into account. This may be supported by the finding that effector-selection 
is one of the earliest stages of action planning, preceding the specification of other action 
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features, such as force, velocity or trajectory (see Bernier, Cieslak & Grafton, 2012 for recent 
evidence). Second, it is possible that the task itself encouraged participants to engage in a 
relative concrete mode of action planning that involves the specific body parts. The reason is 
that in all tasks in the previous experiments, participants knew in advance that the body part 
they used for mental practice would also be the body part required for executing the response. 
Participants were therefore very much motivated to establish an effector specific 
representation of the rhythm sequences.  
Experiments 7 and 8 were designed to explore whether mental practice is flexible enough to 
operate on relatively high level that is independent from the body parts involved, if this is 
encouraged by the task situation (for example, because participants are not sure if the body 
part used for execution will be the same as the one used during mental practice). The 
previous design does not allow us to resolve this question, as the establishment of flexible, 
body-part independent rhythm representation would give rise to a null effect: no negative 
compatibility effects would be expected for participants that mentally practice in such an 
abstract manner, and, for example, only establish a mental representation of the left and right 
button presses, independent of the body part involved. Experiment 7 and 8 therefore utilize a 
transfer task to test the potential abstract-ness of action plans that are established through 
mental practice.  
Transfer of learning is defined to occur when learning in one context or with one set of 
materials impacts on performance in another context or with other related materials. It is 
defined as the influence of previous experiences on performance of a new skill or on the 
learning of a new skill (Magill, 2007). For example learning to swim freestyle helps a 
person later to learn more quickly to swim many kinds such as breaststroke, backstroke and 
butterfly. Transfer is typically distinguished as near, intermediate and far, which describes 
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the amount of correspondence between the new and the old skill, with increasing learning 
speed the closer the new skill is to the already existing skill. For example the skills needed 
for dribbling hand and basketball are near, while transfer of skills between tennis and table 
tennis may be intermediate or far. Thorndike (1923) argued that transfer depended on 
identical elements in two performances and that most performance were simply too different 
from one another for much transfer to be expected. In contrast, some recent authors argue 
that all skill learning is, in fact, a sort of transfer, as all new skills build, to some extent, on 
what has been acquired earlier (e.g., Rosalie & Muller, 2013).  
An intriguing finding is that – like we have suggested for mental practice – transfer of motor 
skills seems to happen mostly on the level of action planning (Lohse, Healy & Sherwood, 
2010). For example, various studies have investigated intermanual transfer: from one body 
part to the other, typically from the dominant hand to the other hand, or vice versa (e.g., 
Hicks, Frank, & Kinsbourne, 1982; Thut et al., 1997). These studies have consistently found 
that motor skills can be transferred, with some losses, from one body part to the other, 
arguing that a large part of motor skill are indeed represented in an effector independent 
manner (e.g., Parlow & Kinsbourne, 1989; Thut et al., 1997). Similarly, studies have found 
that the amount of transfer is influenced by factors affecting performance on the task or 
planning level (e.g., trajectories in allocentric space), but not by factors affecting 
performance on low-level effector level (e.g., trajectories on body-part centric coordinate 
systems, Lohse, et al., 2010), again supporting a relatively abstract representation of motor 
skills established during mental practice.  
This suggests that transfer might operate on similar planning-level representations as mental 
practice, and that motor skills established through mental practice may lend itself excellently 
for subsequent transfer. Indeed, other authors have similarly theorized that while physical 
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practice is typically more effective in skill acquisition, mental practice may play a key role 
in enabling later transfer of a skill (Wohldman, Healy & Bourne, 2008). Indeed, a recent 
study, using a combined behavioral and near infrared spectography (NIRS) approach 
supported this idea. Amemiya, Ishizu, Ayabe, & Kojima, (2010) compared transfer of a 
finger tapping motor skill to the contralateral hand after mental practice and physical 
practice. They found that while mental practice improved subsequent performance of both 
the ipsilateral and the contralateral finger, physical practice improved only ipsilateral 
performance.  
These results suggest that mental practice of the rhythms will go along with relatively large 
transfer. What is relatively unknown is, however, to what imitated movement sequences – 
motor skills learned by observing others – can be transferred to another body part. Prior 
research suggests that observed actions are directly matched to an action plan in the observers’ 
motor repertoire (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). If it is the case, then these plans might, 
by virtue of the body part observed, be body part specific as well. In other words, while 
mental practice should potentially be able to generate highly abstract – and therefore 
transferrable motor skills –, the same may not be not the case for imitation. Here, the derived 
motor skills should be very much bound to the body parts they were produced with in the 
observed action. 
To test these questions, Experiment 7 and 8 adapted the prior task to a transfer of learning 
paradigm. In each trial of these experiments, participants first mentally practiced – from a 
symbolic rhythm description in Experiment 7 and from watching somebody else produce the 
rhythm in Experiment 8 – a complex rhythm, to be played with either their hands or their feet. 
They were then expected to reproduce the same or a different, not previously practiced 
rhythm, with either the same or a different body part. The difference in performance between 
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practiced and non-practiced rhythms gives us a measure of the benefits of mental practice 
(see Experiment 2). The extent to which these benefits are reduced when switching to a 
different body part provide a measure for the amount of transfer.  
We hypothesized that, if participants establish relative high-level, abstract rhythm 
representations during mental practice, then we should find that rhythms sequences learned 
with one body part (for example: the hand) can be effectively transferred to another body part 
(for example: the foot). The extent to which performance improvements are lost will provide 
information about how body-part specific the motor plans generated by mental practice are. 
For example, if mental practice of a foot rhythm still benefits execution with a different body 
part, then the data would argue for a relative high-level abstract sequence representation that 
has been established. 
Note that, in both experiments, the motivation to generate relatively abstract, body-part 
independent motor plans was high. Participants were well aware that the body part used for 
mental practice might not be the same as the one used for the performance of the rhythm. 
This allowed us to compare, across Experiments, to what extent mental practice and imitation 
learning enables the generation of such abstract motor plans, and to what extent the 
potentially generated motor plans are restricted.  
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6.1.2 Experiment 7 – Transfer of Symbolic Mental Practice 
 
Experiment 7 tests the transfer of motor skills to another body part, when the motor skills 
were acquired (or at least improved) through mental practice, based on a symbolic rhythm 
description used in Experiment 1 to 4. As in the previous experiments, participants were 
instructed to mentally practice different complex rhythms with either hands or feet, in order 
to later perform as quickly and accurately as possible. In every trial, participants would first 
see a symbolic description of the rhythm that they mentally practiced. They then had to 
produce it. We varied, first, whether the rhythm they later had to produce was the same or a 
different rhythm. Second, we varied whether this rhythm had to be performed with the same 
or a different body part than that used for mental practice.  
This experiment allows us to test, first, if mental practice of the rhythms improves 
performance. If this is the case, participants should make fewer errors when performing the 
same rhythm that they had just practiced, compared to performing a different rhythm. Second, 
if mental practice is body part specific, then these benefits of executing the same rhythm 
(compared to a different one) should only be found when participants are using the same 
body part for mental practice and actual performance.  
Note that participants were very much aware that the body part used for mental practice 
might not be the body part they would ultimately use to produce the rhythm. The motivation 
to engage in an body-part independent mode of mental practice – deriving distal and abstract, 
outcome related motor plans in terms of the sequence of left and right button presses – was 
therefore encouraged, in contrast to the previous experiments. The crucial question is whether 
this manipulation is enough to prompt the formation of body-part independent motor plans, 
and whether this is also the case when the rhythms are learned by observing others in 
Experiment 8. Any differences in the effects between experiments therefore provides new 
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insights to what extent mental practice and imitation learning enables the generation of 
abstract non-motor related action plans.  
6.1.3 Method 
 
Participants: Nineteen students (16 women, 3 men, age range 18-23 years) took part in the 
experiment. Participants satisfied all requirements in volunteer screening and gave informed 
consent approved by the school of Psychology at the University of Plymouth. All participants 
were in good health, had no history of disease or medical treatment that might influence 
motor performance and visual-motor functions. The study was approved by the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee. 
Material & Apparatus. The experiment was manipulated by the program Presentation 
running on a 3.0 GHz PC running Windows XP. Hand response keys were the Ctrl-key 
(operated by participants’ left hand) and Enter key on the number block (operated by the right 
hand). Foot responses were recorded with two foot pedals, which were attached to the floor 
black tape. The distance between the two pedals was 33 cm. Twenty different rhythms were 
used. Ten of these rhythms were to be played with left and right hands and ten were to be 
played with the left and right feet (see Appendix G).  
All rhythms were visually presented in the same format. Each rhythm had 16 lines. As in the 
previous experiments, participants were told that each line corresponded to the click of an 
imagined metronome. Beats that participants had to produce were represented by ‘A’s and 
‘B’s in each line. ’A’s represented button presses or foot pedal presses on the left hand side. 
‘B’s represented beats to be played with the right foot or right key. A line containing both an 
‘A’ on the left side and a ‘B’ on the right designated cases in which both feet and both hands 
should be pressed. Left and right of each rhythm, a symbol depicting either a hand or a foot 
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was shown that indicated with which body part had to be used for mental practice (see Figure 
6.1). 
Procedure. The participants were seated, facing a computer at a distance of approximately 90 
cm. The experiment contained three training and instruction sessions that lasted 18 minutes 
altogether. The actual experiment took about 38 minutes, so the total experiment duration 
was roughly 56 min. The participants were tested individually and participants were 
instructed by the software during training and the actual experiment. 
The first training session consisted of eight trials and served to familiarize participants with 
the execution of the rhythms In each trial, participants were first presented with a cue telling 
them which body parts (hands or feet) they had to use to produce the following rhythm. This 
cue remained on the screen for 2000 ms and read “Produce the following rhythm with the 
hands!” or “Produce the following rhythm with feet” After a short blank (300ms), the rhythm 
was show on the monitor, with pictures to its left and right reminding participants of then 
produced this rhythm while it was on screen. They had 10200ms to complete the rhythm. 
The second training session also consisted of eight trials. Participants were now introduced to 
the mental training component of the task. In each trial, participants were again first 
presented with the cue telling them the body parts (hands or feet) they should use to mentally 
train the rhythm (for 2000 ms). After a short blank (300 ms), they were then shown one of the 
20 rhythms for 10200 ms and were instructed to mentally practice the rhythm, while not 
making any movement. After that a cue said “Now produce the rhythm with hands/feet”. 
After this, the rhythm participants had to play was presented again with small pictures 
indicating hands or feet on the left or right (see Figure .6.1).  
The participants were instructed to initiate and execute the rhythm as quickly as possible. The 
third training session contained 8 trials and was identical to the experiment proper. The 
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course of each trial was identical to the second training session. However, now, the rhythms 
shown in the production interval could either be the same or a different rhythm than the one 
they just practiced. Similarly, they could be instructed to play these same or different rhythms 
with either the same or a different body part. Figure 2 shows a schematic of the trials in the 
actual experiment.  
As before, they had 10500 ms to play the rhythms. There were 80 trials altogether, separated 
by short breaks every 20 trials. All rhythms were shown twice per block, in a different 
randomization for each participant. Across trials, 25% of the rhythms were identical to the 
rhythm that was mentally and had to be performed with the same body part. In another 25% 
of trials, the rhythms were identical to the rhythm that was mentally but had to be performed 
with a different body part. In another 25% of trials, a different rhythm than the one that was 
mentally practiced had to be executed with the same body part. Finally, in 25% of trials a 
different rhythm had to be played with a different body part.  
Measures. We assessed the influence of mental practice on how well participants played the 
rhythms afterwards in terms of two variables. The first dependent variable, total play time, 
reflected the total time participants needed to reproduce a rhythm, from the onset of the 
prompt to start producing the rhythm to the last button press. It was the sum of two 
subordinate measures. Initiation time measured the time it took participants to initiate the 
tapping in the execution interval. For each participant and each trial, we subtracted the time 
of the first button press from the start of the execution interval. Initiation time therefore 
mostly measures impact on the planning processes that take place during rhythm execution 
(cf. Wohldman, et al., 2007; 2008). The second variable, play time, measured the speed with 
which participants produced the rhythms. For each rhythm played by a participant, we 
subtracted the time of the first button press in the execution interval from the last button press. 
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Play time is typically seen to capture primarily execution related processes (cf. Wohldman, et 
al., 2007; 2008).  
The second dependent variable, deviance, measured the accuracy of participants’ 
performance. Again, this was computed as the average of two sub-measures. First, we 
measured the difference between the number of beats that the participants produced and the 
number of beats that were required for this particular rhythm, as a percentage of the total 
rhythm length. Second, we assessed whether the participants’ relative frequency of presses 
with the left and right buttons corresponded to the relative frequency of left and right presses 
required by the rhythm, again as a percentage of total rhythm length.  
For these analyses, trials in which the button presses of the participants deviated by 50% or 
more from the required button presses were excluded, as well as trials in which participants 
took longer than 12 seconds to play the rhythm, or in which there was a pause between two 
button presses longer than 2 seconds. 
 
Figure 6.1 Illustration of the trial sequence in Experiment 7. The trial instruction (left panel) informed 
participants about the body part they had to mentally practice the rhythm with. They then mentally 
trained the rhythm in the mental practice interval (middle panel). In the execution interval (right panel) 
they executed the rhythm. The rhythm to be executed could either be the same or a different rhythm 
than the one they had practiced, and would need to be executed with the same or different body part. 
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6.1.4 Results  
 
The data were analysed separately for Deviance and Total Play Time with repeated measures 
2 x 2 ANOVAs, with two factors. The first factor Body Part (same, different) and Rhythm 
(same, different). Of the 19 participants tested, one participant was excluded, due to problems 
with the response device, which did not store responses. Three participants were excluded 
because they did make valid responses in more than 20% of the trials. 
The analysis of total play time revealed a main effect of factor of Rhythm, F(1,15) = 71.98, p 
< 0.001, 2p =.84, with faster play time for rhythms that had been trained in the same trial, 
compared to rhythms that had not been trained. The main effect of Body Part was not 
significant F(1,15) = .56, p = 0.468, 2p = .038, and neither was the interaction, F(1,15) = 
1.419, p = 0.253, 2p = .092), revealing no evidence for any losses of the benefits of mental 
practice due to switching body parts. Indeed, the difference for better performance for trained 
rhythms was present for both rhythms to be executed with the same, t = 4.24, p < .001, and 
with a different body part, t = 7.23, p < .001, , being, if anything, larger for different body 
parts (See figure 6.2). The pattern of results was statistically identical, if initiation times or 
playing times were analysed separately, revealing similar main effects on both sub-measures 
(initiation time, F(1,15) = 36.48, p < .001, 2p = .723; play time, F(1,15) = 61.69, p < .001, 
2p = .815), but no interactions or main effects of body part.  
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Figure 6.2 Total Play time in Experiment 7. The two left bars show the data for rhythms that 
had to be executed with the same body as used during mental practice of the rhythm, and the 
two right bars when they had to be executed with a different body part. The black bars show 
the data from trials in which the same rhythm had to be executed as the one that was just 
mentally practiced. The white bars show the data when a different rhythm had to be executed. 
Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
The analysis of total deviance revealed no main effect of the factor Body Parts (same, 
different), F(1,15) = .104, p = 0.752, 2p = .007. Also main effect factor of the factor Rhythm 
(same, different) was not significant, F(1,15) = .052, p = 0.823, 2p =.004, and neither was the 
interaction, F(1,15) = 1.336, p = 0.267, 2p = .087, (See Fig,  6.3). Thus, in sum, the measure 
of deviance was not sensitive to either the mental practice or transfer manipulation. 
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Figure 6.3 Total Deviance in Experiment 7. The two left bars show the data for rhythms that 
had to be executed with the same body as used during mental practice of the rhythm, and the 
two right bars when they had to be executed with a different body part. The black bars show 
the data from trials in which the same rhythm had to be executed as the one that was just 
mentally practiced. The white bars show the data when a different rhythm had to be executed. 
Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
6.1.5 Discussion 
 
While Experiment 1 to 6 suggested that mental practice involves activating body part specific 
motor planning processes, Experiment 7 now explored whether the associated performance 
improvements can be transferred to another body part. As in Experiment 2, we found that 
prior mental practice of the rhythms was effective in improving subsequent rhythm 
production time. We found that this affected both the time to initiate the rhythms – according 
to Wohldman et al. (2007. 2008) reflecting an impact on subsequent planning processes –, 
but also playing time, indicator of efficiency of lower level execution processes. Importantly, 
however, this benefit of mental practice could be transferred to a different body part without 
any detectable loss of performance improvements. In other words, if participants mentally 
practiced a foot rhythm, they were afterwards as effective in producing this rhythm with the 
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hand than with the foot. Similarly, when having mentally practiced a hand rhythm, they 
gained as much performance improvements when later having to execute this rhythm with the 
foot than with the hand.  
This finding shows that participants experienced near perfect transfer of a trained rhythm to 
another body part, suggesting a highly abstract mode of representing the skill. At first, this 
might seem like a trivial finding. After all, participants could have simply memorized the 
sequence of left and right button presses, without mentally practicing them. Consider, 
however, that mental practice did not only affect response time, but also playing time as well. 
According to prior research (Wohldman, Healy, & Bourne, 2007; 2008), playing time of such 
button sequences is directly associated with motor execution processes. This suggests that, 
even though that the action plans during mental practice were abstract enough to be 
transferred to another body part, they were nevertheless concrete enough to affect the 
execution of the rhythms itself (playing time), not only the time to plan them (initiation time) 
before execution.   
At first glance, the present results of near-perfect transfer might also seem at odds with the 
involvement of planning related but body part specific motor processes (as suggested in 
Experiments 1 to 6). It is, however, in line with the idea that action planning can occur on 
various levels, some being “proximally” related to the actual motor movements, others more 
“distal” (Hommel et al., 2002), affecting specifically high-level, outcome related 
representations of the intended actions. In our case, for example, planning might have 
occurred on the level of left-right button presses, and the sequence of these presses, but 
decoupled from the body parts involved.  
The finding of near-perfect transfer is also in line with the idea that motor skills established 
through mental practice may lend itself excellently for subsequent transfer (Wohldman, 
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Healy & Bourne, 2008). As noted, Amemiya, Ishizu, Ayabe, & Kojima, (2010) found that 
mental practice improved subsequent performance of both the ipsilateral and the contralateral 
finger, physical practice improved only ipsilateral performance. If one assumes that transfer 
of motor skills happens particularly on the level of planning (e.g., Lohse, Healy & Sherwood, 
2010), this would suggest that action plans established for immediate execution rely strongly 
on body-part related processes, while action plans established for mental practice can be more 
abstract, and may involve representations that can guide action production even though they 
are decoupled from the low-level motor processes that guide the movement of the specific 
body parts (cf. Hommel, et al., 2001).  
 
6.2.1 Experiment 8 - Transfer of Imitation and Mental Practice 
 
Experiment 7 demonstrated near perfect transfer of a motor skill learned with one body part 
(e.g., the hands) to another body part (e.g., the feet), suggesting that the action plans 
established during mental practice are relatively abstract and decoupled from low level motor 
processes. Experiment 8 now tests if a similar high-level mode of planning can be achieved 
also when actions are observed.  
There are reasons to suspect that the body part independence observed in Experiment 7 might 
be not as pronounced here. The symbolic mode of presentation in Experiment 7 might have 
enabled focusing on abstract sequences of left-right button presses, independently of the 
required body parts. In Experiment 8, the body parts are part of the rhythms produced by the 
other person. If it is the case that observed actions are “directly matched” on motor plans in 
the observers’ repertoires (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), these plans should now be body 
part specific; participants should be less able to generate body-part independent 
representations of the observed motor sequences. 
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In Experiment 2, we therefore varied the mode in which the rhythms were presented. As 
before, participants were instructed to mentally practice different complex rhythms with 
either hands or feet, in order to perform them later as quickly and accurately as possible. 
However, now, the rhythms were not presented symbolically, but in the form of a video of 
somebody else performing the rhythm. Again, we varied, first, whether this rhythm they had 
to produce was the same or a different rhythm. Second; we varied whether this rhythm had to 
be performed with the same or different body part than that used for mental practice. 
The predictions were as before. If mental practices of the rhythms improve performance, 
participants should make fewer errors when performing the same rhythm that they had just 
practiced, compared to performing a different rhythm. Second, if mental practice is body part 
specific, then these benefits of executing the same rhythm (compared to a different one) 
should only be found when participants are using the same body part for mental practice and 
actual performance. 
 
6.2.2 Method 
 
Participants: twenty four students (21 women, 3 men, age range 18-23 years) took part in the 
experiment. Participants satisfied all requirements in volunteer screening and gave informed 
consent approved by the school of Psychology at the University of Plymouth. All participants 
were in good health, had no history of disease or medical treatment that might influence 
motor performance and visual-motor functions. The study was approved by the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee. 
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Material, apparatus and procedure. Materials and apparatus were identical to experiment 7, 
with the following exceptions. Participants now did not see a symbolic rhythm description, 
but watched another person produce the same rhythms, as in Experiments 5 and 6 (see figure, 
6.4), and (Appendix H).  
 
Figure 6.4 Illustration of Trial in Experiment 8.  The trial instruction (left panel) informed 
participants about the body part they had to mentally practice the rhythm with. They then 
mentally trained the rhythm in the mental practice interval (middle panel) by observing 
another person execute the rhythm. In the execution interval (right panel) they executed the 
rhythm. The rhythm to be executed could either be the same or a different rhythm than the 
one they had practiced, and would need to be executed with the same or different body part. 
 
6.2.3 Results 
 
The analysis investigated the transfer of learning of rhythms played by another person to 
another body part. As in Experiment 7, we analysed Total Play Time and Total Deviance. Of 
the 24 participants tested, two participants were excluded due to problems with the response 
device, which did not store responses properly. Five participants were excluded because they 
did make valid responses in more than 20% of the trials. 
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Participants’ responses to the rhythms were analysed separately for Total Deviance and Total 
Play Time with a repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the two factors Body Part (same, 
different) and Rhythm (same, different). The analysis of Total Play Time revealed no main 
effect of Body Part, F(1,16) = 2.39, p = .141, 2p = .130, but a highly significant main effect 
of Rhythm, F (1, 16) = 11.129, p = .004, 2p = .410, with on average faster rhythm 
production times for rhythms observed in this trial, compared to not-observed rhythms. 
Importantly, the interaction of the two factors was significant, F(1, 16) = 4.82, p = .043, 2p 
= .232, revealing larger benefits of prior rhythms observations for rhythms that had to be 
executed with the same compared to a different body part. In fact, when analysing the 
difference between trained and untrained rhythms separately for same and different body 
parts, significant difference were only apparent for the trials in which the body part did not 
change, t = 6.07, p < .001, but not for trials in which the body part did was different to the 
previously observed rhythm, t = .96, p = .35.  
The pattern was numerically identical when initiation time and play time were analysed 
separately, even though the interaction just failed to reach significance in both cases (play 
time, F(1, 16) = 2.446, p = . 136, 2p = .180; initiation time, F(1, 16) = 2.887, p = .109, 
2
p 
= .153). Moreover, for both sub-measures the benefit of prior observation was statistically 
present for rhythms to be executed with the same body part (play time, t = 3.44, p = .003; 
initiation time, t = 5.19, p < .001), but not for rhythms to be executed with a different body 
part (play time, t = 2.05, p = .057; initiation time, t = .11, p = .91). 
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Figure 6.5 Total Play Time in Experiment 8. The two left bars show the data for rhythms that 
had to be executed with the same body as used during mental practice of the rhythm, and the 
two right bars when they had to be executed with a different body part. The black bars show 
the data from trials in which the same rhythm had to be executed as the one that was just 
mentally practiced. The white bars show the data when a different rhythm had to be executed. 
Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
The analysis of total deviance revealed no main effects of the factor Body Part (same, 
different), F(1,16) = .271, p = .610, 2p = .017, and no main effect of the factor Rhythm (same, 
different), F(1,16) = .022, p = .884, 2p = .001. As in the analysis of total play time, the 
interaction same and different body part and same and different rhythm was significant, F(1, 
16) = 4.371, p = .04, 2p = .237. As in total play time, the benefit of mental practice for 
playing the rhythm more accurately was larger when the rhythm had to be executed with the 
same compared to a different body part. See (Figure 6.6). However, when analysed separately, 
the difference between same and different rhythms was neither significant for when 
participants used the same body part, F(1,16)= -.97 , p = .34, nor when they used a different 
body part, F(1,16) = 1.56, p = .13.  
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Figure 6.6 Total Deviance in Experiment 8. The two left bars show the data for rhythms that 
had to be executed with the same body part as used during mental practice of the rhythm, and 
the two right bars when they had to be executed with a different body part. The black bars 
show the data from trials in which the same rhythm had to be executed as the one that was 
just mentally practiced. The white bars show the data when a different rhythm had to be 
executed. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
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6.2.4 Discussion 
 
While Experiment 7 demonstrated near perfect transfer of motor skills learned through 
mental practice with one body part to another body part, Experiment 8 shows that this is not 
the case when learning a motor skill through imitation. While prior mental practice enhanced 
performance of rhythms observed to be executed with the same body part, the same benefits 
could not be transferred – and were virtually absent –, when participants had to execute a 
rhythm that they had observed another person perform with a different body part. This 
difference occurred even though in both Experiment 7 and Experiment 8, participants knew 
in advance that they were just as likely to execute the mentally practiced rhythm with the 
same as with another body part. As such, the different findings suggest that mental practice 
allows relatively abstract action representations to be established, which still can effectively 
guide action execution, but not action observation. Action representation established through 
action execution appear to mandatorily be bound up with low-level motor properties – here 
the body part involved – and can not easily be abstracted away from these properties. 
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7.1 General Discussion - Overview 
 
Due to its role in novice and expert motor performance, mental practice is an important 
research focus in sports psychology and education. However, not much progress has been 
made in specifying the underlying processes, which are still either conceptualized as purely 
symbolic (Driskell et al., 1994; Minas, 1978; Sackett, 1934), or as deeply rooted in 
execution-related processes: emerging from a subliminal activation of the motor apparatus 
that allows actors to play through the sensations going along with the actions (Jacobson, 1930; 
Jeannerod & Frak, 1999). The present work instead proposes to conceptualize mental practice 
in terms of the action planning processes that precede motor execution, but which are 
nevertheless closely linked to them. The eight experiments reported here tested some first 
predictions of such an account.  
In the following, I will first review the main results of these experiments, and will then 
discuss in detail how mental practice and imitation learning can be conceptualized in terms of 
action planning processes, as well as the discuss the implications of such an approach for 
outstanding question in sports psychology. 
 
7.2 Summary of the Results of Experiment 1 to 6  
 
Experiment 1 to 6 utilized a classical compatibility paradigm to test whether mental practice 
of motor skills relies on body-part specific motor processes involved in physical action 
execution. Participants mentally practiced complex rhythms with their feet or hands while 
using either the same or different body parts to respond to unrelated sounds played while they 
mentally practiced. Across experiments, we found a direct influence of mental practice on 
these unrelated responses. It took the form of a negative compatibility effect, making it harder 
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for participants to respond with the body part concurrently used in mental practice. Thus, 
while mentally practicing a rhythm with the hand participants were more likely to make 
accidental responses with the foot. Conversely, while mentally practicing with the foot, they 
were more likely to accidentally respond with the hand.  
This effect of mental practice on the execution of an unrelated response was robust and 
generalizable. It was found when participants were mentally practicing the rhythms in order 
to perform them later from memory (Experiment 1) and when they merely practiced to 
improve their subsequent performance (Experiment 3). It was found when mental practice 
and execution of the rhythms was interrupted by the mental practice/execution of a different 
rhythm (Experiment 4), suggesting that the effect does not simply reflect the anticipation of 
an imminent response with this body part, and can be found when mental practice and 
execution are separated by an intervening task. It was found when participants practiced by 
watching somebody else perform the rhythms (Experiment 5), ruling out that the effects 
originate from the translation of a symbolic rhythm into motor codes, and extending our data 
to the case of observation learning or imitation. The effect was only eliminated when the need 
for mental practice was eliminated as well, while visual stimulation and task relevance of the 
rhythms was kept identical (Experiment 6), tying the negative compatibility effects directly to 
the mental practice of the rhythms, rather than to other, unrelated task-aspects.  
This direct effect of mental practice on overt motor behavior supports the view that mental 
practice is, at least partially, enactive and draws upon body part specific motor processes. In 
addition, it provides new insights about the nature about this motor involvement. The 
negative compatibility effects observed here are not consistent with the view that mental 
practice gives rise to the same sub-threshold activation of low-level motor systems as the 
passive observation of action. Across studies and experimental paradigms, positive 
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compatibility effects are typically observed, where viewing of action-related stimuli 
facilitates – rather than impairs – the execution of motorically similar responses (for reviews, 
see Hommel, 2001; Kornblum, et al., 1990). Viewing hand and foot actions, for example, 
facilitates unrelated responses with the same body parts (Bach et al., 2007; 2008).  
Rather, the negative compatibility effects were in line with the view that our mental practice 
task specifically draws upon the higher-level planning processes (cf. Hommel et al., 2001; 
Thomaschke, 2012). These processes allow actors to establish concrete plans for motor 
execution, by “binding” the different features an action needs to be successful – speed, 
direction of motion, or, here, the sequence of button presses with a certain body part – into 
unified plans for action. This binding allows even complex movements to be coordinated 
across effector systems, but, at the same time, renders the involved features less accessible 
for other responses. For example, it has been found that simply planning a left or right 
response makes it harder to make responses in the same direction, and planning to use a body 
part impairs the use of the same body part for another response (Stoet & Hommel, 1997; for 
similar effects, see Hübner & Druey, 2006; Schuch & Koch, 2004, 2010).  
Our data therefore suggest that mental practice is based on these planning-related motor 
processes. During mental practice, they may allow actors to develop complex plans for action 
that are aligned with both their goals and the (anticipated) demands of the performance 
situation. Several additional aspects of our results supported such an involvement of planning 
related processes in mental practice. First, if the negative compatibility effects indeed reflect 
the formation of action plans, then they should be obtained only as long as the task requires 
participants to develop concrete plans for eventual execution. Indeed, across experiments, 
negative compatibility effects were found as long as the presented rhythms were the basis of 
subsequent motor performance, irrespective of whether this happened immediately after 
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practice (Experiment 1, 3 and 5) or only after an intervening task (Experiment 4). However, 
as soon as the rhythms were not the basis of a future action of the participants – the condition 
under which positive compatibility effects are typically observed in other stimulus response 
compatibility paradigms – these effects were completely eliminated (Experiment 6). 
Second, another feature of planning accounts is that the integration of features into action 
plans, while preventing their use for other responses, will benefit the execution of current 
plans. Such an effect was revealed, first, in Experiment 2, which confirmed that mentally 
practicing the rhythms does indeed not only improve subsequent motor planning processes 
(as measured by time to initiate the rhythms), but motoric execution itself (measured by the 
time to execute the complete rhythm), replicating prior work on mental practice (Wohldman 
et al., 2007; 2008).  
Second, and more importantly, such an effect was revealed by analysis of the spontaneous 
motor responses participants sometimes made during mental practice. We found that those 
participants with the strongest negative compatibility effects were the most likely to 
accidentally press a response key during mental practice. Importantly, these responses were 
made with the body part concurrently used for mental practice, consistent with the idea that 
they reflect action plans that participants “forgot” to inhibit. Although post-hoc, these data 
therefore confirm that mental practice indeed has two coupled effects on overt motor 
behavior: it prevents the use of the relevant action features in unrelated responses, and, at the 
same time, facilitates the execution of the current plan (cf. Hommel et al., 2001).  
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7.2 Summary of the Results of Experiments 7 and 8 
 
Experiments 7 and 8 took a complementary approach to testing planning accounts of mental 
practice. Recent ideomotor models of action planning (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001) 
assume that actions can be planned on multiple levels, some more proximally related to the 
motor commands sent to the muscle, some more distally. In other words, a hierarchy of action 
goals is typically assumed, with higher level goals directly related to the ultimate outcomes of 
the actions (“the goals”), and lower level goals (“the means”) that specify the motor actions 
required to achieve these goals (Ondobaka & Bekkering, 2012). Depending on one’s skill and 
its automatization, it may suffice to explicitly only specify the overall goals of a skill to 
trigger the subordinate release of motor movements. Such a relatively high level encoding of 
action goals may achieve relatively fluent encoding of actions, even in changing 
environments, where different motor actions are required for goal achievement. For example, 
when driving somewhere, experienced drivers explicitly only specify their target location and 
trust their lower level motor representations to safely guide them towards the goal, without 
requiring effortful cognitive involvement (Bargh and Wyer 1997). 
Considering the prevalence of relatively abstract codes guiding action execution, it may be 
surprising that Experiment 1 to 6 revealed robust involvement of low-level motor features (i.e. 
the body part to be used) in mental practice, especially as the task could be solved by merely 
memorizing a sequence of left and right button presses in a non-effector specific manner. 
There are two potential reasons for this effect. The first is that participants were simply not 
skilled enough at producing the rhythms to engage in such a high level encoding of the 
rhythms. In other words, participants might have felt that imagery of the complete 
movements was required for effective performance. The second reason is, of course, that the 
task itself favoured such a body-part centric encoding of the mentally practiced actions. The 
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reason is that participants could be absolutely sure that the body part they used for mental 
practice was also the body part they would later use to reproduce the rhythm. This task aspect 
might have discouraged establishing relatively abstract action plans, and favoured plans 
specifying the involvement of body parts.  
Experiment 7 and 8 therefore tested whether participants could also generate more abstract 
action plans during mental practice. We used a classical transfer task, in which participants 
were not sure about whether the same body part would be used during mental practice and 
execution, and where therefore more abstract action plans were favoured by the task. 
Participants first mentally practiced a rhythm, as before, but later had to execute this rhythm 
– or a different, non-practiced rhythm – with either the same or a different body part. 
The results of Experiment 7 revealed that, indeed, participants were able to generate very 
abstract action plans. As in Experiment 2, we found that previous practice of a rhythm 
benefitted subsequent performance, affecting both time to initiate the rhythm as the time to 
fully execute it (cf. Wohldman, Healy, & Bourne, 2007, 2008). Importantly, however, the 
same benefits were achieved when execution involved a different body part than mental 
practice. This suggests that in this setting, where participants were not sure about the body 
part required for ultimate rhythm execution, participants were able to generate very abstract 
rhythm representations that could be transferred – without detectable impairments – to 
another body part. This excellent transfer of mentally practiced actions is in agreement with 
previous research and theorizing (e.g., Wohldman et al., 2008; Amemiya et al., 2010; Lohse 
et al., 2010). 
A striking finding was that this perfect transfer only held when rhythms were practiced based 
on a symbolic rhythm description in Experiment 7. In Experiment 8, participants practiced 
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exactly the same rhythms by observing others. They watched as another person tapped the 
rhythm – with either their hands or their feet – and attempted to learn their own subsequent 
performance by watching this performance. In this setup, mental practice only benefitted 
rhythms played with the same body part as used in mental practice. This difference suggest 
that whereas relatively abstract action plans can be established during mental practice from a 
symbolic rhythm description, as soon as visual input is available that directly links the motor 
skill to a body part – as during action observation – any generated action plans are very much 
concrete and body part specific. It is consistent with the finding that imitation relies on 
systems that directly match an observed action to an action plan in the observer’s motor 
repertoire (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009). De-coupling the body part from this representation might 
have required additional effort that participants did not engage in, considering the overall 
difficulty of the task. 
 
7.3 Towards an Action Planning Account of Mental Practice 
 
The results of the present study have direct implications on our knowledge of the processes 
underlying mental practice. Previous research has conceptualized these processes still as 
either conceptualized as purely symbolic (Driskell et al., 1994; Minas, 1978; Sackett, 1934), 
or as deeply rooted in execution-related processes: emerging from a subliminal activation of 
the motor apparatus that allows actors to play through the sensations going along with the 
actions (Jacobson, 1930; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999). By linking mental practice to the planning 
processes that form the interface between higher-level “cognitive” and lower-level motor 
processes, the present work suggests a unification of these approaches.  
In such views, mental practice can be conceptualized as the planning activity itself, with 
physical execution either being indefinitely delayed or decoupled (cf. Koch, Keller, & Prinz, 
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2004). As it is the case for action planning, it involves a linkage of intended action features to 
a concrete action plan: actors specify how the action would look and feel if it were 
successfully carried out, so that it matches both the goals of the individual and the external 
demands. Subsequent rehearsal allows these “movement images” to be sharpened and refined, 
so that they can drive motor execution more effectively and are aligned with both the goals of 
the individual and the demands of the performance situation. 
Because such planning views incorporate aspects of both symbolic and enactive accounts of 
mental practice, they allow us to integrate several conflicting findings in the literature and 
resolve several debates. 
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7.4 Implications for Research in Sport Psychology 
 
Current accounts of mental practice struggle with the finding that mental practice primarily 
benefits skills with cognitive components (e.g., Feltz & Landers, 1983; Hird et al., 1991; 
Ryan & Simons, 1983), but also has direct effects on motor execution and physiological 
variables (e.g., Wohldmann et al., 2007; 2008; Yue & Cole, 1992). While enactive theories 
struggle to account for the cognitive benefits, symbolic accounts have problems explaining 
motor or physiological benefits (cf. Moran, Campbell, Holmes, & MacIntyre, 2012). Action 
planning accounts, however, can account for both. The cognitive benefits are in line with the 
notion that action planning is particularly beneficial if several sets of complex action 
sequences have to be coordinated, or integrated with complex environmental demands. 
Physiological or execution-related benefits, in contrast, can be explained because the purpose 
of action planning is effective execution. If mental practice allows existing movement plans 
to be sharpened and refined, they will become effective drivers of later lower-level motor 
processes. Indeed, the reported manual strength gains after mental practice, for example, are 
not due to changes to the actual muscles, but due to more effective signals reaching them 
(Yue & Cole, 1992; Ranganathan,  Siemionow, Liu, Sahgal, Yue, 2004). Moreover, the 
strength gains are tied to the vividness of imagery during mental practice, consistent with the 
idea that sharper mental images generated during mental practice are better drivers of 
intended motor output (Reiser et al., 2011).  
A second debate concerns the factors influencing the benefits of mental practice on 
performance. Motor theories naturally account for the larger benefits of 1st person (rather 
than 3rd person) and kinesthetic imagery, where people imagine the actions as if they would 
be carrying them out (Lorey et al., 2009; Stinear et al., 2006). After all, this type of imagery 
most closely mirrors the sensory feedback that would emerge from a subliminal activation of 
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the motor system. However, those theories struggle to account for effects of imagery that are 
not motor-related. It is known, for example, that mental practice has stronger benefits when 
imagery also captures the environmental, cognitive and emotional aspects of the performance 
situation (for a review, see Holmes & Collins, 2001). As the purpose of action planning is 
precisely the mediation between the higher-level goals, environmental influences and the 
action possibilities of the individual, planning-related theories can account for the influences 
of such extraneous (“distal”) variables, ensuring that the resulting action plans properly take 
into account the demands of the performance situation (for an extensive review of the role of 
distal variables in action planning, see Hommel et al., 2001; for use affective action features 
in action planning, see Eder, Müsseler, & Hommel, 2012). 
7.5 Implications for Neuroscientific Investigations into Motor Imagery 
 
Understanding mental practice in terms of action planning-related processes allows us to 
integrate conflicting findings from neuroimaging studies. First, while neuroimaging studies 
are generally consistent with the idea that action-related structures are engaged in motor 
imagery, there is considerable debate whether this activation reflects execution-related 
processes. For example, when amputees report the feeling of being able to move their 
amputated hand, both the phenomenological experience and brain activation corresponds 
more closely to actual movement execution than to movement imagery, even though 
kinaesthetic feedback is controlled (Raffin et al., 2012). Such dissociations are no surprise for 
planning accounts, which assume that any overlap should be found for planning but not 
execution related structures. Indeed, primary motor cortex activation – closely linked to 
physical motor execution – is not consistently found across studies on motor imagery. In 
contrast, pre-motor cortex activation, much more closely aligned to action planning, is 
consistently observed (for a review, see Lotze & Halsband, 2006). Moreover, a recent fMRI 
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study has directly compared imagery-related brain activity with both preparatory and 
execution related activity. As predicted from the present findings, motoric activation during 
imagery was aligned with planning, not execution (Hanakawa et al., 2006).  
Second, our data may have something to say on why these motoric activations during motor 
imagery are sometimes inhibitory (rather than facilitatory). These inhibitory effects are 
typically discussed in terms of a prevention of spontaneous motor outflow (e.g., Solodkin et 
al., 2004; Tipper & Bach, 2011). Our present data suggest that they may be better interpreted 
as a more natural consequence of an action planning process that involves a binding of motor 
features to a not-yet executed motor plan such that these features are not available for 
unrelated responses. Indeed, the areas involved for these suppressive effects on motor output 
during imagery – the supplementary motor area and the parietal visuomotor areas (Solodkin 
et al., 2004) – are also crucial nodes in action planning networks (e.g., Hanakawa et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the supplementary motor area in particular has been implicated in action-effect 
learning and may therefore represent specifically the intended features of an action plan 
(Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher et al., 2008). 
Finally, our data shed light on whether the pre-motoric activation is merely an 
epiphenomenon rather than a crucial component of motor imagery (for discussion, see 
Jeannerod, 1994; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Our data argue against this possibility. First, 
the fact that the inhibitory effects are linked to the execution of an action plan, suggest not a 
mere motor outflow process but a goal-directed linkage to action goals. Second, and more 
importantly, our paradigm also revealed effects of motor execution on mental practice, such 
that subsequent execution was facilitated when mental practice was interrupted by a response 
with the same body part. Such effects are seen to be strong evidence for an involvement of 
motor structures in cognition, as they reflect a “backwards” influence, where activation in the 
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motor system influences task performance. They would not be expected if motor systems 
would not play a crucial role in the task. For our study, they therefore suggest that the 
motoric activations during mental practice play a fundamental role in mental practice and are 
functionally linked to the improvement of the trained motor skill. Of course, the effects 
observed here need to be interpreted with caution, as they were not as robust as the negative 
compatibility effects and our paradigm was not designed to investigate these action-mental 
practice effects. Nevertheless, the presence of these action-to-imagery effects provides direct 
evidence that motor structures are required for mental practice.  
It is an open question why these action-to-practice effects were in the opposite direction as 
the compatibility effects found in the responses to the sounds. Along with certain models of 
motor imagery (Jeannerod, 1995) and mental practice (Beisteiner, H llinger, Lindinger, 
Lang, & Berthoz, 1995), we speculate that whereas response initiation requires that the 
required action codes are not already used for another goal, imagery can benefit from 
concurrent kinesthetic feedback that strengthens the underlying movement representations. 
Although testing these ideas is beyond the scope of the present article, it is important to note 
that identical dissociations had been observed in the original studies on action effect binding 
(Stoet & Hommel, 1999). While planning a response inhibits the use of similar motoric 
features in other responses, executing an action provides additional activation to – and 
facilitates the execution of – movement plans that are currently held active, and share some of 
the action’s features. As such, while having to be clarified by further research, these effects of 
motor execution on mental practice nevertheless (1) highlight the functional role of action 
related processes for successful mental practice, and (2) further support the proposed link to 
prior research on the processes of action planning. 
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7.6 Linking Mental Practice and Imitation Learning 
 
While Experiments 1 to 4 link action planning to mental practice, Experiment 5 extended this 
link to imitation, a research focus of anthropology and developmental psychology. Imitation 
is a key means for transmitting knowledge, both within and between generations. It allows 
observers to put themselves into the other people’s shoes, vicariously experience the outcome 
of their actions and learn from their experience, enabling them to later reproduce the 
behaviours and achieve the same goals. It is often assumed that humans can imitate because 
watching others does give rise to a subtle ‘resonance’ of the motor apparatus, which 
manifests as a tendency to non-strategically and non-consciously copy others’ behaviour and 
body postures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; for reviews, see Heyes, 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 
2012; van der Wel et al., 2013). It is assumed that, during imitation proper, observers would 
similarly “tap into” this motor activation to reproduce the desired behaviors. 
Experiment 5 challenges this idea by revealing that the general motor resonance evoked by 
incidentally observing others is absent when people watch others with the express purpose to 
imitate. Instead, the to-be-imitated action features were less – rather than more – available for 
unrelated responses. Experiment 4 therefore suggests that watching somebody to imitate is 
more akin to mental practice than automatic imitation and gives rise to the same binding 
effects. Imitating an observed action may therefore similarly involve the purposeful selection 
of intended action features and “binding” them into an action plan. The only difference is that 
in mental practice these features were self-generated, while in imitation they could be 
extracted directly from the other person’s action. 
The implied difference between imitation proper and more automatic forms of imitation is 
consistent with recent theoretical developments in infant research. There, imitation is 
112 
 
similarly distinguished from its more automatic counterparts, and understood as a goal-
directed process, which serves the acquisition of knowledge about which sequences of motor 
behaviours achieve a particular outcome (Csibra, 2008; Heyes, 1993). For example, when 
intending to imitate, infants do not – as motor resonance accounts would imply – merely copy 
the observed movements, but link them to a goal: they faithfully reproduce the seen motor 
behavior only, when they believe it to be crucial for goal achievement (e.g. Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Bekkering, Wohlschlaeger & Gattis, 2000). Moreover, these 
forms of imitation are not automatic. They emerge from an intentional stance for learning, 
which is triggered either by the motivation to attain desire action consequences (for a review, 
see Elsner, 2007), or by “natural pedagogy”, the various cues adults give to signal to the 
infant that there is something to learn (for an overview, see Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  
Experiment 5 therefore suggests that this distinction between automatic and intentional 
imitation is mirrored on the motor level. Whereas incidentally watching somebody generally 
primes the motor apparatus for similar movements, in goal-directed imitation, these 
activations are linked to a goal. Only motor behaviours that subserve this goal will be 
facilitated, while others – even when motorically similar – are inhibited. This hypothesis 
could be tested in typical mimicry experiments, where it is found that observation of another 
person elicits a tendency to perform similar movements (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). We 
predict that, when the other person is just incidentally watched, their movements (e.g. face 
rubbing) should evoke not only to automatic imitation of the specific movements, but also a 
more general tendency to use the same body part, even for unrelated movements (e.g., finger 
tapping). In contrast, when the goal is to watch the other person for later imitation, such a 
general activation of the body parts should be absent. Any movements that are observed 
should capture specifically the to-be-imitated behaviour.  
113 
 
References  
 
 
Allami, N., Paulignan, Y., & Brovelli, A. (2008). Visuo-motor learning with combination of 
different rates of motor imagery and physical practice. Experimental Brain Research, 
105–113. doi:10.1007/s00221-007-1086-x. 
Amemiya, K., Ishizu, T., Ayabe, T., & Kojima, S. (2010). Effects of motor imagery on 
intermanual transfer: a near-infrared spectroscopy and behavioural study. Brain 
research, 1343, 93–103. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2010.04.048 
Anderson, L. M. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Artificial Intelligence, 149(1), 
91–130. doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00054-7. 
Annett, J. (1995). Motor imagery: Perception or Action. Neuropsychologia, 33, 1395-1417.  
Annett, J. (1996). On knowing how to do things: a theory of motor imagery. Cognitive Brain 
Research, 3, 65–69. 
Arora, S., Aggarwal, R., Sirimanna, P., Moran, A., Grantcharov, T., Kneebone, R., Sevdalis, 
N., Darzi (2011). Mental practice enhances surgical technical skills: a randomized 
controlled study. Annals of Surgery, 253(2), 265-70. 
Bach, P. & Tipper, S.P. (2007). Implicit action encoding influences personal-trait judgments. 
Cognition, 102, 151-178 
Bach, P. Peatfield, N.A., & Tipper, S.P. (2007). Focusing on body sites: the role of spatial 
attention in action perception. Experimental Brain Research, 178, 509–517. 
Bach, P., Griffiths, D., Weigelt, M., & Tipper, S.P. (2010). Gesturing meaning. Non-action 
words activate the motor system. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4:214. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2010.00214. 
114 
 
Bargh, J. A., Wyer, R. (1997). The automaticity of everyday life. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates :Publishers. 
Beilock, S. L., & Gonso, S. (2008). Putting in the mind versus putting on the green: expertise, 
performance time, and the linking of imagery and action. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 61(6), 920-32.  
Beilock, S. L., & Gonso, S. (2008). Putting in the mind versus putting on the green: expertise, 
performance time, and the linking of imagery and action. The Quarterly journal of 
experimental psychology (2006), 61(6), 920–32. doi:10.1080/17470210701625626 
Beisteiner, R., H llinger, P., Lindinger, G., Lang, W., & Berthoz, A. (1995). Mental repre- 
sentations of movements: Brain potentials associated with imagination of hand move- 
ments. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 96, 183–193 
Bekkering, H., Wohlschlaeger, A., & Gattis, M. (2000). Imitation of gestures in children is 
goal-directed. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Section A, 53(1), 
153-164. 
Bernier, P.-M., Cieslak, M, & Grafton, S. T. (2012). Effector selection precedes reach 
planning in the dorsal parieto-frontal cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 108, 57-68. 
Bertenthal, B. I., Longo, M. R., & Kosobud, A. (2006). Imitative response tendencies 
following observation of intransitive actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 32, 210-225. 
Bertollo, M., Saltarelli, B., & Robazza, C. (2009). Mental preparation strategies of elite 
modern pentathletes. Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 10(2), 244–254. 
doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2008.09.003. 
Brass, M. Bekkering, H., Wohlschlager, A., & Prinz, W. (2000). Compatibility between 
Observed and Executed Finger Movements: Comparing Symbolic, Spatial, and 
Imitative Cues. Brain and Cognition, 44, 124–143. 
115 
 
Butler, A. J., Page, S. J., Aj, A. B., & Sj, P. (2006). Mental Practice With Motor Imagery : 
Evidence for Motor Recovery and Cortical Reorganization After Stroke. Arch phys 
Med Rehabil, 87(December), 2–11. doi:10.1016/j.apmr.2006.08.326 
Caliari, P. (2008). Enhancing Forehand Acquisition in Table Tennis: The Role of Mental 
Practice. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 20(1), 88–96. 
doi:10.1080/10413200701790533 
Chartrand, T.L., Bargh, J.A. (1999). The chameleon effect: the perception-behavior link and 
social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6), 893-910. 
Cohn, P. J. (1990). Preperformance routines in sport: Theoretical support and practical 
applications. Sport Psychologist, 4, 301-312. 
Corbin, C. (1972). Mental practice. In W. Morgan (Ed.), Ergo- genic aids and muscular 
performance (pp. 94-1 18). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Craighero, L., Fadiga, L., Rizzolatti, G., and Umiltà, C. (1999). Action for perception: a 
motor-visual attentional effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 25, 1673–1692. 
Csibra, G. (2008). Action mirroring and action understanding: An alternative account. In P. 
Haggard, Y. Rosetti and M. Kawato (eds). Attention and Perfomance XXII: 
Sensorimotor Foundations of Higher Cognition,(pp. 435-459). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 
148-153. 
De Lange, F. P., Helmich, R. C., & Toni, I. (2006). Posture influences motor imagery: an 
fMRI study. NeuroImage, 33(2), 609–17. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.07.017 
De Lange, F.P., Roelofs, K., Toni, I. (2008). Motor imagery: a window into the mechanisms 
and alterations of the motor system. Cortex, 44, 494–506. 
116 
 
Decety, J. (1996). Do imagined and executed actions share the same neural substrate? 
Cognitive Brain Research, 3(2), 87-93. 
Decety, J., & Michel, F. (1989). Comparative analysis of actual and mental movement times 
in two graphic tasks. Brain & Cognition, 11, 87-97. 
Decety, J., Philippon, B., & Ingvar, D. (1988). rCBF landscapes during motor performance 
and motor ideation of a graphic gesture. European Psychiatric Neurological Science, 
238, 33–38. 
Dechent, P., Merboldt, K.D., Frahm, J. (2004). Is the human primary motor cortex involved 
in motor imagery? Cognitive Brain Research, 19(2), 138-44. 
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding 
motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research, 91, 176-180. 
Driskell, J. E., Copper, C., & Moran, A. (1994). Does Mental Practice Enhance Performance? 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(4), 481-492. 
Dutzi, I. B., & Hommel, B. (2009). The microgenesis of action–effect binding. Psychological 
Research, 73, 425–435. 
Eder, A.B., Müsseler, J., & Hommel, B. (2012). The structure of affective action 
representations: Temporal binding of affective response codes. Psychological Research, 
76, 111-118. 
Elsner, B. (2007). Infants’ imitation of goal-directed actions: The role of movements and 
action effects. Acta Psychologica, 124(1), 44-59. 
Elsner, B., & Hommel, B. (2001). Effect anticipation and action control. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27, 229-240. 
Elsner, B., Hommel, B., Mentschel, C., Drzezga, A., Prinz, W., Conrad, B., Siebner, H. 
(2002). Linking actions and their perceivable consequences in the human brain. 
NeuroImage, 17, 364–372. 
117 
 
Feltz, D., & Landers, D. (1983). The effects of mental practice on motor skill learning and 
performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Sport Psychology, 5, 25–57. 
Feltz, D., Landers, D., & Becker, B. (1988) A revised meta-analysis of the mental practice 
literature on motor skill learning. Washington, DC : National Academy Press. 
Georgopoulos, A. P. and Massey, J. T. (1987). Cognitive spatial-motor processes. 
Experimental Brain Research, 65, 361-370,  
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). Developmental psychology: rational 
imitation in preverbal infants. Nature, 415(6873), 755-755. 
Gillmeister, H., Catmur, C., Liepelt, R., Brass, M. & Heyes, C. (2008) Experience-based 
priming of body parts: a study of action imitation. Brain Research, 1217, 157–170. 
Greenwald, A.G. (1970). Sensory feedback mechanisms in performance control: With special 
reference to the ideomotor mechanism. Psychological Review, 77, 73–99. 
Grouious, G. (1992). The effect of mental practice on diving performance. International 
Journal of Sport Psychology, 23, 60–69. 
Grush, Rick (2004). The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and 
perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 377-442. 
Guillot, A., Collet, C., Nguyen, V. A., Malouin, F., Richards, C., & Doyon, J. (2009). Brain 
activity during visual versus kinesthetic imagery: an fMRI study. Human brain 
mapping, 30(7), 2157–72. doi:10.1002/hbm.20658 
Guillot, A., Lebon, F., Rouffet, D., Champely, S., Doyon,J., & Collet, C. (2007). Muscular 
responses during motor imagery as a function of muscle contraction types. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 66 ,18–27. 
Hale, B. (1982). The effects of internal and external imagery on muscular and ocular 
concomitants. Journal of Sport Psychology, 4, 379–387. 
118 
 
Hale, B. (2003). Effect of mental imagery of a motor task on the Hoffmann reflex. 
Behavioural Brain Research, 142(1-2), 81–87. doi:10.1016/S0166-4328(02)00397-2 
Hall, C. R., Rodgers, W. M., & Barr, K. A. (1990). The use of imagery by athletes in selected 
sport. sport psychologist,4,1-10. 
Hall, E.G., & Erffmeyer, E.S. (1983). The effect of visuomotor rehearsal with videotaped 
modeling on free throw accuracy of intercollegiate female basketball players. Journal 
of Sport Psychology, 5, 343-346.  
Hall, N. D., & Fishburne, G. J. (2010). Mental Imagery Research in Physical Education. 
Mental Imagery Research in Physical Education, 5(1). doi:10.2202/1932-0191.1045. 
Hanakawa, T., Dimyan, M. A., & Hallett, M. (2008). Motor Planning , Imagery , and 
Execution in the Distributed Motor Network : A Time- Course Study with Functional 
MRI. Blood, Oxford University Press (December), 2775–2788. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn036. 
Hardy, L., & Jones, G. (1994). Current issues and future directions for performance- related 
research in sport psychology. Journal of Sports Sciences, 12,61e92 
Hardy, Lew; Callow, Nichola(1999) Efficacy of external and internal visual imagery 
perspectives for the enhancement of performance on tasks in which form is important. 
Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, Vol 21(2), Jun 1999, 95-112. 
Hemayattalab, R., & Movahedi, A. (2010). Effects of different variations of mental and 
physical practice on sport skill learning in adolescents with mental retardation. 
Research in developmental disabilities, 31(1), 81–6. doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2009.07.022. 
Heyes, C. (2011). Automatic imitation. Psychological Bulletin, 137(3), 463. 
Heyes, C. M. (1993). Imitation, culture and cognition. Animal Behaviour, 46, 999-1010. 
Hicks, R. E., Frank, J. M., & Kinsbourne, M. (1982). The temporal locus of bimanual skill 
transfer. Journal of General Psychology, 107, 277-281. 
119 
 
Hinshaw, K. (1991). The effects of mental practice on motor skill performance: Critical 
evaluation and meta-analysis. Imaginations, Cognition and Personality, 11, 3–35. 
Hird, J. S., Landers, D. M., Thomas, J. R.,&Horan, J. J. (1991). Physical practice is superior 
to mental practice in enhancing cognitive and motor task performance. Journal of Sport 
and Exercise Psychology, 8, 281- 293. 
Holmes and D. Collins. (2001). The PETTLEP approach to motor imagery: A functional 
equivalence model for sport psychologists. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 
doi:10.1080/10413200109339004. 
Holt, L. E., & Beilock, S. L. (2006). Expertise and its embodiment: examining the impact of 
sensorimotor skill expertise on the representation of action-related text. Psychonomic 
bulletin & review, 13(4), 694–701.  
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding). Psychological 
Research, 512–526. doi:10.1007/s00426-009-0234-2. 
Hommel, B. (2010). The Simon effect as tool and heuristic. Acta Psychologica, 136(2), 189-
202.  
Hommel, B. (2013). Ideomotor action control: On the perceptual grounding of voluntary 
actions and agents. In W. Prinz, M. Beisert & A. Herwig (Eds.), Action science: 
Foundations of an emerging discipline (pp. 113-136). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hommel, B., Müsseler, M., Aschersleben, A. & Prinz, W. (2001). The theory of event coding 
(TEC). A framework for perception and action planning. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 
24, 849–878. 
Hübner, R., & Druey, M. (2006). Response execution, selection, or activation: What is 
sufficient for response-related repetition effects under task shifting? Psychological 
Research, 70, 245–261. 
120 
 
Hughes, G., Desantis, A., & Waszak, F. (2012). Mechanisms of Intentional Binding and 
Sensory Attenuation: The Role of Temporal Prediction, Temporal Control, Identity 
Prediction, and Motor Prediction. Psychological Bulletin, 139(1), 133-151. 
Iacoboni, M. (2009). Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons. Annual Review of Psychology, 
60, 653-670. 
Ionta, S., Fourkas, A.D., Fiorio, M., Aglioti, S.M. (2007). The influence of hands posture on 
mental rotation of hands and feet. Experimental Brain Research, 183(1), 1-7. 
Ionta, S., Perruchoud, D., Draganski, B., & Blanke, O. (2012). Body context and posture 
affect mental imagery of hands. PloS one, 7(3), e34382. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034382 
Jacobsen, E. (1930). Electrical measurements of neuromuscular states during mental 
activities. I. Imagination of movement involved skeletal muscle. American Journal of 
Physiology, 91, 567–608. 
James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology. London, L: Macmillan. 
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: neural correlates of motor intention and 
imagery. Behav. Brain Sci. 17, 187-245, 1994. 
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neural simulation of action: a unifying mechanism for motor cognition 
NeuroImage, 14, 103–109. 
Jeannerod, M. & Frak, V. (1999) Mental imaging of motor activity in humans. Current 
Opinion in Neurobiology, 9,735–39. 
Jeannerod, M., & Frak, V. (1999). Mental imaging of motor activity in humans. Current 
opinion in neurobiology, 9(6), 735–9. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10607647 
Jeannerod, M.(1995). Mental imagery in the motor context. Neuropsychologia,33,1419–1433. 
121 
 
Joachim, H. & Wenderoth, N. (2007). Gabriele Wulf: On a attention focus and motor 
learning. Research Quarterly, 1, 1–64. 
Jowdy, D. P., Murphy, S. M., & Durtschi, S. (1989). An assessment of the use of imagery by 
elite athletes: Athlete, coach and psychological perspectives. Colorado Springs, CO: 
United States Olympic Committee. 
Knuf, L., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). An analysis of ideomotor action. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 130 (4), 779-798. 
Koch, I., Keller, P., & Prinz, W. (2004). The ideomotor approach to action control: 
Implications for skilled performance. International Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology, 2(4), 362-375. 
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., Osman, A.(1990). Dimensional overlap: Cognitive basis for 
stimulus–response compatibility — A model and taxonomy. Psychological Review, 99, 
253–270. 
Kunde, W. (2001). Response-Effect Compatibility in Manual Choice Tasks. Journal of 
experimental psychology, 27(2), 387-394  
Landauer, T. K. (1962). Rate of implicit speech. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 15, 646. 
Lebon, F., Rouffet, D., Collet, C., & Guillot, a. (2008). Modulation of EMG power spectrum 
frequency during motor imagery. Neuroscience letters, 435(3), 181–5. 
doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2008.02.033. 
Liu, K. P., Chan, C. C., Lee, T., Hui-Chan, C. W. (2004). Mental Imagery for Promoting 
Relearning for People After Stroke: A Randomized Controlled Trial. Archives of 
Physical Medical Rehabilitation, 85, 1403-1408. 
Lohse, K. R., Healy, A. F., & Sherwood, D. (2010). Mental Practice in the Intermanual 
Transfer of Motor Skills. Practice, 5(1). doi:10.2202/1932-0191.1052 
122 
 
Lorey, B., Bischoff, M., Pilgramm, S., Stark, R., Munzert, J., & Zentgraf, K. (2009). The 
embodied nature of motor imagery: the influence of posture and perspective. 
Experimental Brain Research, 194(2), 233-43. 
Lotze, M., Halsband, H. (2006) Motor Imagery. Journal of Physiology – Paris, 99(4-6), 386-
395. 
Lotze, M., Montoya, P., Erb, M., Hulsmann, E., Flor, H., Klose, U., Birbaumer, N., Grodd, 
W., 1999. Activation of cortical and cerebellar motor areas during executed and 
imagined hand movements: an fMRI study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 11, 491–501. 
MacKay, D. G. (1981). The problem of rehearsal or mental practice. Journal of Motor 
Behavior, 13, 274-285. 
Macuga, K.L. & Frey, S.H. (2012). Neural representations involved in observed, imagined, 
and imitated actions are dissociable and hierarchically organized. NeuroImage, 59(3), 
2798-2807. 
Magill, R., A. (2007). Motor Learning and Control concepts and applications. United States: 
McGraw- Hill. 
Mahon, B.Z. & Caramazza, A. (2008). A Critical Look at the Embodied Cognition 
Hypothesis & a New Proposal for Grounding Conceptual Content. Journal of 
Physiology - Paris, 102, 59-70. 
Martin, K.A., & Hall, C.R. (1995). Using mental imagery to enhance intrinsic motivation. 
Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 17, 54-69. 
Melcher, T., Weidema, M., Eenshuistra, R.M., Hommel, B., Gruber, O. (2008). The neural 
substrate of the ideomotor principle: an eventrelated fMRI analysis. NeuroImage, 39, 
1274–1288. 
Miller, K.J., Schalk, G., Fetz, E.E., den Nijs M,, Ojemann, J.G. and Rao, R.P. (2010). 
Cortical activity during motor execution, motor imagery, and imagery-based online 
123 
 
feedback. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 107(9), 4430-4435. 
Minas, S. C. (1978). Mental practice of a complex perceptual motor skill. Journal of Human 
Movement Studies, 4, 102-109. 
Moran, A., Campbell, M., Holmes, P., & MacIntyre, T. (2012). Mental imagery, action 
observation, and skill learning. Skill Acquisition in Sport: Research, Theory and 
Practice, 2-19. 
Morris, T., Spittle, M., Watt, A.P. (Eds.).(2005). Technical Aids to Imagery. In Imagery in 
Sport (pp. 237-266). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. 
Mulder Th, Zijlstra S, & De Vries S.(2005) Observation, imagination and execution of an 
effortful movement: more evidence for a central explanation of motor imagery. Exper 
Brain Res,163:344–351.  
Munroe-Chandler, K., Hall, C., & Fishburne, G. (2008). Playing with confidence: the 
relationship between imagery use and self-confidence and self-efficacy in youth soccer 
players. Journal of sports sciences, 26(14), 1539–46. doi:10.1080/02640410802315419 
Munzert, J., Lorey, B., & Zentgraf, K. (2009). Cognitive motor processes: the role of motor 
imagery in the study of motor representations. Brain research reviews, 60(2), 306-26.  
Murphy, S. M. (1994). Imagery intervention in sport. Medicine and Science in sports and 
exercise, 26,486-494. 
Murphy, S.M. and Martin, K.A. (2002) ‘The Use of Imagery in Sport’, in T. Horn (ed.), 
Advances in Sport Psychology (2nd ed. pp. 405–39). Cham- paign, IL: Human Kinetics. 
Murphy, S.M.(1994). Imagery intervention in sport. Medicine and Science in sports and 
exercise, 26,486-494. 
Müsseler, J. & Hommel, B. (1997). Blindness to response-compatible stimuli. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 23(3), 861–72. 
124 
 
Nair, G. D., Purcott, L.K., Fuchs, A., Steinberg, F.,& Kelso,K.A.J. (2003) .Cortical and 
cerebellar activity of the human brain during imagined a and executed unimanual and 
bimanual action sequences: a functional MRI study, Cognitive Brain Research. 15, 
250– 260. 
Naito, E., Kochiyama, T., Kitada, R., Nakamura, S., Matsumura, M., Yonekura, Y. & Sadato, 
N. (2002). Internally simulated movement sensations during motor imagery activate 
cortical motor areas and the cerebellum. Journal of Neuroscience, 22, 3683–3691. 
Noel, R. (1980). The effect of visuo-motor behavior rehearsal on tennis performance. Journal 
of Sport Psychology, 2, 220–226. 
Ondobaka, S., & Bekkering, H. (2012). Hierarchy of idea-guided action and perception-
guided movement. Frontiers in Psychology, 3(December), 579. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00579 
Page, S.J., Szaflarski, J.P., Eliassen, J.C., Pan, H., Cramer, S.C. (2009). Cortical plasticity 
following motor skill learning during mental practice in stroke. Neurorehabilitation and 
Neural Repair, 23(4), 382-8. 
Parlow, S. E., & Kinsbourne, M. (1989). Asymmetrical transfer of training between hands: 
Implications for interhemispheric communication in the normal brain. Brain and 
Cognition, 11, 98-113. 
Porro, C.A., et al. (1996). Primary motor and sensory cortex activation during motor 
performance and motor imagery: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 7688–7698. 
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and Action Planning. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 37–41. 
Purves,D.,Brannon,M.E.,Cabeza,R.,Huettel,A.S.,LaBar,S.K.,Platt,L.M.&  Woldorff, G.M.   
(2008). Principles of Cognitive Neuroscience. Sunderland, Masschustts, MA: Sinauer 
Associates,Inc. 
125 
 
Raffin, E., Mattout, J., Reilly, K. T., & Giraux, P. (2012). Disentangling motor execution 
from motor imagery with the phantom limb. Brain : A Journal of Neurology, 135(Pt 2), 
582–95. doi:10.1093/brain/awr337 
Ranganathan, V. K., Siemionow, V., Liu, J. Z., Sahgal, V., & Yue, G. H. (2004). From 
mental power to muscle power—gaining strength by using the mind. 
Neuropsychologia, 42(7), 944-956. 
Reed, C. (2002). Chronometric comparisons of imagery to action: Visualizing versus 
physically performing springboard dives. Memory & Cognition, 30, 1169-1178. 
Reiser, M., Büsch, D., Munzert, J. (2011). Strength gains by motor imagery with different 
ratios of physical to mental practice. Frontiers of Psychology, 2(194). 
Richardson, A. (1967) Mental Practice: a review and discussion (part 1). Research Quarterly 
(38): 95-107 
Richardson, D.C., Dale, R. & Spivey, M. (2007). Eye movements in language and cognition: 
A brief introduction. In: Gonzalez–Marquez, Coulson, Mittelberg, & Spivey, eds., 
Methods in Cognitive Linguistics, 323–344.  
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual review of 
neuroscience, 27, 169–92. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230. 
Rodrigues, E. C., Lemos, T., Gouvea, B., Volchan, E., Imbiriba, L. a, & Vargas, C. D. (2010). 
Kinesthetic motor imagery modulates body sway. Neuroscience, 169(2), 743–50. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2010.04.081 
Rodriguez ,M., Llanos,C., Gonzalez, S., & M. Sabte. (2008). How Similar Are Motor 
Imagery and Movement? Behavioural Neuroscience, Vol. 122,, 910–916. 
Rosalie, S. M., & Müller, S. (2013). A Model for the Transfer of Perceptual-Motor Skill 
Learning. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, (August), 37–41. 
126 
 
Ross, S. (1985). The effectiveness of mental practice in improving the performance of college 
trombonists. Journal of Research in Music Education, 33, 221–230. 
Roure, R., Collet, C., Deschaumes-Molinaro, C., Delhomme, G., Dittmar, A., Vernet-Maury, 
E., (1999). Imagery quality estimated by autonomic response is correlated to sporting 
performance enhancement. Physiology and Behavior, 66, 63–72.  
Ryan, D., & Simons, J. (1983). What is learned in mental practice of motor skills. Journal of 
Sport Psychology, 5, 419–426. 
Sackett, R.S. (1934). The influence of symbolist rehearsal upon the retention of maze task. 
Journal of General Psychology, 10, 376-395. 
Salmon, J., Hall, C., & Haslam, I. (1994). The use of imagery by soccer players. Journal of 
Applied Sport Psychology, 6 (1), 116-133. 
Schmidt, R. A. (2003). Motor Schema Theory After 27 Years : Reflections and Implications 
for a New Theory. Recreation, (December), 366–375. 
Schuch, S. & Koch, I. (2004). The costs of changing the representation of action: Response 
repetition and response-response compatibility in dual tasks. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 30(3), 566-582. 
Schuch, S., & Koch, I. (2010). Response-repetition effects in task switching with and without 
response execution. Acta Psychologica, 135, 302-309. 
Shaw, W.A. (1938) ‘The Distribution of Muscular Action Potentials during Imaging’, 
Psychological Record, vol. 2, pp. 195–216. 
Shin, Y. K., Proctor, R. W., Capaldi, E. J., & Publication, O. F. (2010). A Review of 
Contemporary Idiomatic Theory A Review of Contemporary Idiomatic Theory. 
Psychological Bulletin. doi:10.1037/a0020541. 
Simon, J. R., & Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory S–R compatibility: The effect of an irrelevant 
cue on information processing. Journal of Applied Psychology, 51,300−304. 
127 
 
Simon, J. R. (1969). Reaction towards the source of stimulation. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 81, 174–176. 
 Smith, D. & Collins, D. (2004). Mental practice, motor performance, and the late CNV. 
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 26, 215-221. 
Smith, D., & Holmes, P. (2004). The Effect of Imagery Modality on Golf Putting 
Performance. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 385–395. 
Solodkin, A., Hlustik, P., Elinor Chen, E., & Small, S.L. (2004). Fine Modulation in Network 
Activation during Motor Execution and Motor Imagery Cereb. Cortex (2004) 14(11): 
1246-1255 first published online May 27, 2004 doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhh086 
Sprague, N., Ballard, D., & Robinson, A. L. (2007). Modeling Embodied Visual Behaviors. 
ACM, Transactions Applied Perception, 4(2), 1–23. doi:10.1145/1265957.1265960 
Stinear, C.M., Byblow, W.D., Steyvers, M., Levin, O. & Swinnen, S.P. (2006). Kinesthetic, 
but not visual, motor imagery modulates corticomotor excitability. Experimental Brain 
Research, 168, 157-164. 
Stoet, G. & Hommel, B. (1999). Action planning and the temporal binding of response codes. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 25,1625–
40.  
Stuart j.h. Biddle (1985).  Mental preparation, mental practice and strength tasks: a need for 
clarification. Journal of Sports Sciences, 3, 67-74 
Symes, E., Ottoboni, G., Tucker, M., Ellis, R., and Tessari, A. (2009). When motor attention 
improves selective attention: the dissociating role of saliency. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. doi: 
10.1080/17470210903380806. 
Symes, E., Ottoboni, G., Tucker, M., Ellis, R., and Tessari, A. (2010). When motor attention 
improves selective attention: the dissociating roleof saliency. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 63 (7), 
1387–1397. 
128 
 
Symes, E. (2010). Integrating action and language through biased competition. Frontiers in 
Neurorobotics, 4(June), 1–13. doi:10.3389/fnbot.2010.00009 
Symes, E., Tucker, M., Ellis, R., Vainio, L., & Ottoboni, G. (2008). Grasp preparation 
improves change detection for congruent objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Human Perception and Performance, 34(4), 854–71. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.34.4.854 
Tartaglia, E. M., Bamert, L., Mast, F. W., & Herzog, M. H. (2009). Human Perceptual  
Learning by Mental Imagery. Current Biology, 19(24), 2081–2085. 
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2009.10.060. 
Thomaschke, R., Hopkins, B., Miall, R. C. (2012). The planning and control model (PCM) of 
motorvisual priming: Reconciling motorvisual impairment and facilitation effects. 
Psychological Review, 119(2), 388-407. 
Thorndike E L. (1923) The influence of first year Latin upon the ability to read English. 
School Sociology 17, 165-168. 
Thut, G., Halsband, U., Regard, M., Mayer, E., Leenders, K. L., & Landis, T. (1997). What is 
the role of the corpus collosum in intermanual transfer of motor skills? A study of three 
cases with callosal pathology. Experimental Brain Research, 113, 365- 370. 
Tipper, S.P. & Bach, P. (2008). Your own actions influence how you perceive other people: a 
misattribution of action appraisals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44 (4), 
1082-1090. 
Tlauka, M. & McKenna, P.F. (1998). Mental imagery yields stimulus-response compatibility. 
Acta Psychologica, 98, 67-79. 
Topolinski, S. (2012). The sensorimotor contributions to implicit memory, familiarity, and 
recollection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(2), 260-281. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2001). The potentiation of grasp types during visual object 
recognition. Visual Cognition, 8, 769–800. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relations between seen objects and components of 
potential actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 24(3), 830–846. 
129 
 
Van Der Wel, R.P.R.D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Action perception from a 
common coding perspective. In K. Johnson and M. Schiffrar (Eds.). People Watching: 
Social, Perceptual and Neurophysiological Studies of Body Perception(pp. 101-119). 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Vogt, S. (1996). Imagery and perception-action mediation in imitative actions. Cognitive 
Brain Research, 3, 79–86. 
Wang, Y., & Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2012). Social top-down response modulation (STORM): 
a model of the control of mimicry in social interaction. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6(June), 153. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00153 
Weigelt, M., Ahlmeyer, T., Lex, H., & Schack, T. (2011). The cognitive representation of a 
throwing technique in judo experts – Technological ways for individual skill 
diagnostics in high-performance sports. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 12(3), 231–
235. doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2010.11.001. 
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9(4), 
625–36. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12613670. 
Winter, H. (2002, November 2). Coaches united in seeking the psychological edge. The 
Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
Wohldmann, E. L., Healy, A. F., & Bourne, L. E. Jr. (2007). Pushing the limits of 
imagination: Motor imagery for learning sequences and skill. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 254-261. 
Wohldmann, E., Healy, A, F., & Bourne, L. E. Jr. (2008). A mental practice superiority effect: 
Less retroactive inhibition and more transfer than physical practice. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 823-833. 
Wohlschläger, a. (2001). Mental object rotation and the planning of hand movements. 
Perception&psychophysics,63(4),709–18. 
Wohlschläger, A. & Wohlschläger, A. (1998). Mental and manual rotation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 24, 397 – 412. 
130 
 
Wolpert, D.M. & Flanagan, J.R. (2001). Motor Prediction. Current Biology, 11(18), 729-732. 
Wolpert, D. M., & Ghahramani, Z. (2000). Computational Principles of Movement 
Neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 1212-1217. 
Wolpert, D. M., & Kawato, M. (1998). Multiple paired forward and inverse models for motor 
control. Neural Networks, 11(7), 1317-1329. 
Wühr, P. & Müsseler, J. (2001) Time course of the blindness to response compatible stimuli. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(5), 
1260–70. 
Wulf, G. (2007). Attention Focus and Motor Learning: A Review of 10 years of Research. E-
Journal Bewegung und Training. ISSN 1612-5770. 
Yue, G., Cole, K.J. (1992). Strength increases from the motor program: comparison of 
training with maximal voluntary and imagined muscle contractions. Journal 
Neurophysiology. 67, 1114–1123. 
Zimmermann-Schlatter A, Schuster C, Puhan MA, Siekierka E, Steurer J. (2008). Efficacy of 
motor imagery in post-stroke rehabilitation: a systematic review. Journal of 
Neuroengineering and Rehabilitation, 5:8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix (A) Experiment one: 
Training one  
"Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to practice different rhythms 
in your mind and later to re-produce them as quickly as possible.  
At the start of each trial you will first be informed about the body parts you will have to use 
to re-produce the rhythm: either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys), or the feet 
(using the red and green foot pedals). You can remove your shoes if you like. 
Then, the rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example." 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
132 
 
.  . 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Enter key or the right foot pedal.  
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears 
on the screen with the designated keys (foot or hand)." 
Training two: 
"In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first watch and practice the rhythm in your mind, and then reproduce it a few seconds 
later.  Again, you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to  
use to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left Ctrl and right Enter 
keys), or the feet (using the red and green foot pedals).Then, the rhythm you will have to 
practice in your mind will appear.  
Press any button to see an example." 
"A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
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A  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Don't do anything as long as the rhythm is on the screen --- Use your imagination!  
Wait till the rhythm disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm. Please try to produce the 
rhythm with the highest possible speed while still being accurate. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase..." 
Training three sessions: 
"There is one more complication. We are interested in how much you will benefit from 
mentally practicing the different rhythms. The rhythms that you will have to produce can 
either be the same or different to the rhythms that you have trained. Two differences are 
possible: 
1. The rhythms might need to be performed with a different body part than how you 
originally trained them.  For example, you might need to mentally practice a rhythm with the 
foot and then tap it with the hands. 
 2. The rhythms that you need to perform might themselves be different than the ones you 
practiced.  For example, you might practice a rhythm starting with AABAAB while you may 
have to perform a rhythm starting with BABABA, 
You will be informed before you produce the rhythms of both the body part that you will 
need to use and which rhythm you will have to tap. 
Press any key for a short training phase." 
Actual experiment: 
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Pressing the enter-button starts the actual experiment. Remember; please respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Thank you for taking part in our experiment! 
The experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you might have 
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Appendix (B ) Experiement two  
Training session one: 
 
"Dear participant! 
thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to practice different rhythms  
in your mind and later to re-produce them as quickly as possible.  
At the start of each trial you will first be informed about the body parts you will have to  
use to re-produce the rhythm: either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys), or  
the feet (using the red and green foot pedals). You can remove your shoes 
if you like. 
Then, the rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example." 
"A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
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Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot 
pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Enter key or the right foot pedal.  
 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears 
on 
the screen with the designated keys (foot or hand)." 
 
Training session two: 
"In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first watch and practice the rhythm in your mind, and then reproduce it a few seconds 
later.  
Again, you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to  
use to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left Ctrl and right Enter 
keys), or the feet (using the red and green foot pedals).  
 
Then, the rhythm you will have to practice in your mind will appear.  
Press any button to see an example." 
"A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
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A  . 
A  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Don't do anything as long as the rhythm is on the screen --- Use your imagination!  
Wait till the rhythm disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm. Please try to produce the 
rhythm with the highest possible speed while still being accurate. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase..." 
 
Trianing session3: 
"There is one more complication. We are interested in how much you will benefit from  
mentally practicing the different rhythms.  
The rhythms that you will have to produce will therefore be either the same or different  
to the rhythms that you have trained. For example, you might practice a rhythm starting  
with AABAAB while you may have to perform a rhythm starting with BABABA, 
So please try to mentally practice the presented rhythms as effectively as you can. 
Howevewer, even if the rhythm you need to produce is not the same as the one you  
practiced, please try nevertheless to tap it as accurately and as quickly as possible.  
Press any key for a short training phase." 
"Pressing any button starts a short training phase..." 
Actual Experiment: 
"Dear participant! 
Pressing the enter-button starts the actual experiment. Remember; please respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Thank you for taking part in our experiment! 
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The experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you might have 
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Appendix (C) Experiment three:  
Training session one: First instruction screen: 
Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to tap different rhythms with 
hands or feet.  At the start of each trial you will first be informed about the body parts you 
will have to use to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys), or the 
feet (using the red and green foot pedals). You can remove your shoes if you like. Then, the 
rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example." 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
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Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An  *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Ctrl key or the right foot pedal.  
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears 
on the screen with the designated keys (foot or hand)." 
Training session 2 
First instruction screen: 
"In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first mentally train the rhythm by watching another person perform it on the computer 
screen. Then you will have to reproduce the rhythm yourself. 
Again, you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to  used 
(by yourself and the other person) to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the  left and right 
Ctrl keys), or the feet (using the foot pedals).  
Then, the a video showing the other person tap the rhythm will appear. Please watch closely, 
and use this video to mentally practice the rhythm.  
 Press any button to see an example."  "Don't do anything as long as the video is playing  --- 
Use your imagination and mentally practice the rhythm that you see the other person perform!  
Wait till the movie disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase..." 
Training session 3  
First instruction screen: 
"There is one more complication. We are interested in how much you will benefit from 
mentally practicing 
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the different rhythms. The rhythms that you will have to produce can either be the same or 
different to the rhythms that you have trained. Two differences are possible: 
1. The rhythms might need to be performed with a different body part than how you 
originally trained them.   For example, you might need to mentally practice a rhythm with the 
foot and then tap it with the hands. 
 2. The rhythms that you need to perform might themselves be different than the ones you 
practiced.   For example, you might practice a rhythm starting with AABAAB while you may 
have to perform a   rhythm starting with BABABA, You will be informed before you produce 
the rhythms of both the body part that you will need to use and which rhythm you will have 
to tap. 
Press any key for a short training phase." 
 Actual experiment: 
Pressing the enter-button starts the actual experiment. Remember; please respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Thank you for taking part in our experiment! 
The experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you might have 
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Appendix (D) Experiment four:  
Training session 1 First instruction screen: 
Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to memorize different 
rhythms and later to re-produce them. At the start of each trial you will first be informed 
about the body parts you will have to use to re-produce the rhythm: either the hands (using 
the left and right Ctrl keys), or the feet (using the red and green foot pedals). You can remove 
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your shoes if you like. Then, the rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example. 
Second instruction screen:          
                                                                       A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An  *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Enter key or the right foot pedal. Pressing 
any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears on the 
screen with the designated keys (foot or hand). 
Training session 2 First instruction screen: 
In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first watch and memorize the rhythm, and then reproduce it a few seconds later. Again, 
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you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to use to re-
produce the rhythm: either the hands (using the left Ctrl and right Enter keys), or the feet 
(using the red and green foot pedals).Then, the rhythm you will have to memorize will appear. 
Press any button to see an example. Second instruction screen: 
A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
A B 
. . 
A . 
A . 
A B 
. . 
A . 
. . 
don't do anything as long as the rhythm is on the screen, though, wait till the rhythm 
disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm.Pressing any button starts a 
short training phase... 
Training session 3 / First instruction screen: 
There is one more complication. We will try to interrupt your memorization. We will be 
playing two different sounds - a low and a high beep - to you during the intervals in which 
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you try to memorize the rhythms. If you hear a low beep, please press both foot pedals as 
quickly as possible. If you hear a high beep, please press both finger keys as quickly as 
possible. This task is designed to disrupt your concentration. Please try to not be interrupted. 
Respond to the beeps as fast as you can, but don't let your concentration be disrupted. Press 
any key to hear the different sounds. 
Actual experiment  
Pressing the enter-button starts the actual experiment. Remember; please respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible..
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Thank you for taking part in our experiment! The experimenter will be happy to answer any 
questions you might have. 
 
Appendix (E) Experiment Five 
Training session one: 
Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to practice different rhythms  
in your mind and later to re-produce them as quickly as possible.  
At the start of each trial you will first be informed about the body parts you will have to use 
to re-produce the rhythm: either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys), or the feet 
(using the red and green foot pedals). You can remove your shoes if you like. Then, the 
rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example. 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
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.  . 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An  *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Ctrl key or the right foot pedal.  
 Pressing any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears 
on the screen with the designated keys (foot or hand). 
 Training session two: 
"In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first watch and practice the rhythm in your mind, and then reproduce it a few seconds 
later.  Again, you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to  
use to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left Ctrl and right Ctrl keys), or the feet 
(using the red and green foot pedals).  Then, the rhythm you will have to practice in your 
mind will appear.  
Press any button to see an example." 
 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
A  . 
A  B 
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.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Don't do anything as long as the rhythm is on the screen --- Use your imagination!  
Wait till the rhythm disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm. Please try to produce the 
rhythm with the highest possible speed while still being accurate. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. 
 Training three: 
"There is one more complication. We will try to interrupt your mental practice. We will be 
playing two different sounds - a low and a high beep - to you during the intervals in which 
you try to practice the rhythms in your mind. If you hear a low beep, please press both foot 
pedals as quickly as possible. If you hear a high beep, please press both finger keys as 
quickly as possible. This task is designed to disrupt your concentration. Please try to not be 
interrupted. Respond to the beeps as fast as you can, but don't let your concentration be 
disrupted. 
Press any key to hear the different sounds. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. 
Training complete! 
Actual experiment: 
149 
 
Pressing the enter-button starts the actual experiment. Remember; please respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. 
 
Thank you for taking part in our experiment! The experimenter will be happy to answer any 
questions you might have. 
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 Appendix (F) Experiment Six 
Training one: 
"Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. 
Your task will be to watch different rhythms that another person’s taps with hands or feet and 
then to check whether they correspond with a rhythm that is subsequently displayed in a more 
abstract format. 
Press any button to see an example of a rhythm movie. While you watch it, try to memorize 
the sequence of movements." 
 
 
"These movies can also show rhythms performed with the feet. 
Press any button to see the same rhythm done with the feet..." 
  
 
 
"As said, your task will be to check whether this movie corresponded to a rhythm  
that is displayed in a more abstract format. 
Press any button to see the same rhythm presented abstractly..." 
"A  . 
.  B 
.  . 
.  . 
A  . 
.  B 
.  . 
.  . 
A  B 
Watch the rhythm  
Watch the rhythm  
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.  . 
.  . 
.  . 
A  . 
.  B 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An  *A* marks a beat with the left foot or hand. A 
*B* marks a beat with the right foot or hand.  
Pressing any button starts a short training phase that shows rhythms that can either match or 
not match the abstract description. " 
 
 
Training two: 
In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first watch and practice two rhythms in your mind, and then reproduce them later.  
Again, you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to  use to 
tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys),  
or the feet (using the red and green foot pedals).  
Then, the rhythm you will have to practice in your mind will appear.  
Press any button to see an example." 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Watch the rhythm  Tap the rhythm   
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A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
A  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
 
In any trial, you will have to mentally practice two different rhythms in sequence, 
both with the same body part (feet or hands). Don't do anything as long as the rhythm is  on 
the screen --- Use your imagination!  
Wait till the rhythm disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the two rhythms in sequence, first one, and 
then the other.  Please try to produce the rhythm with the highest possible speed while still 
being accurate. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. 
       Training complete! 
Training three: 
"There is one further complication. We will try to interrupt your memorization. We will be 
playing two different sounds - a low and a high beep - to you while you are watching and 
memorizing the rhythms.   If you hear a low beep, please press both foot pedals as quickly as 
possible Press the left and right ctrl keys if you hear the high sound as quickly as possible.  
Pressing V indicates a rhythm that matches the abstract description, and pressing N indicates 
a different rhythm.. Pressing any button starts a short training phase. 
"A  B 
.  . 
153 
 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An A marks a beat with the left key (\) or the left 
foot pedal. A B marks a beat with the right key (/) or the right foot pedal. Don't do anything 
as long as  the rhythm is on the screen, though, wait till the rhythm disappears and an 
instruction saying  
*Now produce the rhythm* appears. You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the 
rhythm.  
Pressing any button starts a short training phase..." 
Actual experiment 
"Pressing a button starts the experiment... Pressing V indicates a rhythm that matches the 
abstract description, and pressing N indicates a different rhythm. 
     
. 
Watch the rhythm  Respond to sound   Say Yes or No   
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 Appendix (G) Experiment Seven   
Training one: 
"Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to practice different rhythms 
in your mind and later to re-produce them as quickly as possible. At the start of each trial you 
will first be informed about the body parts you will have to use to re-produce the rhythm: 
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either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys), or the feet (using the red and green foot 
pedals). You can remove your shoes if you like. 
Then, the rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example." 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Enter key or the right foot pedal.   
Pressing any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears 
on the screen with the designated keys (foot or hand)." 
----Thank you---- 
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Training two: 
"In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
Be to first watch and practice the rhythm in your mind, and then reproduce it a few seconds 
later. Again, you will be informed at the start of each trial which body part you will have to  
use to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left Ctrl and right Enter keys), or the feet 
(using the red and green foot pedals).   Then, the rhythm you will have to practice in your 
mind will appear. Press any button to see an example." 
 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
A  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Don't do anything as long as the rhythm is on the screen --- Use your imagination!  
Watch the rhythm  
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Wait till the rhythm disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm. Please try to produce the 
rhythm with the highest possible speed while still being accurate. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase..."  
 
 
Training three: 
"There is one more complication. We are interested in how much you will benefit from 
mentally practicing the different rhythms. The rhythms that you will have to produce can 
either be the same or different to the rhythms that you have trained. Two differences are 
possible: 
1. The rhythms might need to be performed with a different body part than how you 
originally trained them.  For example, you might need to mentally practice a rhythm with the 
foot and then tap it with the hands. 
 2. The rhythms that you need to perform might themselves be different than the ones you 
practiced.   For example, you might practice a rhythm starting with AABAAB while you may 
have to perform a    rhythm starting with BABABA, 
You will be informed before you produce the rhythms of both the body part that you will 
need to use and which rhythm you will have to tap. 
Press any key for a short training phase." 
  
 
Actual experiment  
Watch Rhythm   Tap the rhythm   
Watch Rhythm   Tap the rhythm   Corresponding by 
mental practice  
m 
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"Please rest your hands on the two ctrl-keys and the feet on the two foot pedals. Press any of 
these buttons to start the experiment. 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in our experiment! The experimenter will be happy to answer any 
questions you might have. 
 
 
 
Watch Rhythm   Corresponding by 
mental practice  
m 
 
Tap the rhythm   
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 Appendix (H) Experiment Eight  
Training session one: 
"Dear participant! 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Your task will be to tap different rhythms with 
hands or feet.   At the start of each trial you will first be informed about the body parts you 
will have to use to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the left and right Ctrl keys), or the 
feet (using the red and green foot pedals). You can remove your shoes 
if you like.  Then, the rhythm will appear. Press any button to see an example." 
"A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Imagine a metronome ticking in each line. An *A* marks a beat with the left Ctrl key or the 
left foot pedal. A *B* marks a beat with the right Ctrl key or the right foot pedal.  
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Pressing any button starts a short training phase. Try to reproduce each rhythm that appears 
on the screen with the designated keys (foot or hand)." 
Training two: 
"In the actual experiment you will not produce the rhythms right away. Rather, your task will 
be to first mentally train the rhythm by watching another person perform it on the computer 
screen. Then you will have to reproduce the rhythm yourself. Again, you will be informed at 
the start of each trial which body part you will have to used (by yourself and the other person) 
to tap the rhythm: either the hands (using the  left and right Ctrl keys), or the feet (using the 
foot pedals).  Then, the video showing the other person tap the rhythm will appear. Please 
watch closely and use this video to mentally practice the rhythm.   
Press any button to see an example." 
 
 
"Don't do anything as long as the video is playing  --- Use your imagination and mentally 
practice the rhythm that you see the other person perform!  
Wait till the movie disappears and an instruction saying *Now produce the rhythm* appears. 
You will then have around 8 seconds to reproduce the rhythm. 
Pressing any button starts a short training phase..." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watch the video   
Watch the video   
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"A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
A  B 
.  . 
A  . 
.  . 
Training three: 
"There is one more complication. We are interested in how much you will benefit from 
mentally practicing the different rhythms. The rhythms that you will have to produce can 
either be the same or different to the rhythms that you have trained. Two differences are 
possible: 
1. The rhythms might need to be performed with a different body part than how you 
originally trained them. 
   For example, you might need to mentally practice a rhythm with the foot and then tap it 
with the hands.  
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2. The rhythms that you need to perform might themselves be different than the ones you 
practiced.    For example, you might practice a rhythm starting with AABAAB while you 
may have to perform a    rhythm starting with BABABA, 
You will be informed before you produce the rhythms of both the body part that you will 
need to use and which rhythm you will have to tap. 
Press any key for a short training phase." 
   
 
Actual experiment  
"Please rest your hands on the two ctrl-keys and the feet on the two foot pedals. Press any of 
these buttons to start the experiment. 
   
  
 
 
Watch video  Tap Rhythm   Corresponding by 
mental practice  
m 
 
Watch video  Corresponding by 
mental practice  
m 
 
Tap Rhythm   
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. Thank you for taking part in our experiment! 
The experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you might have. 
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